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INTRODUCTION

In the highly controversial' 1983 watershed case Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,' the states won a significant victory in their efforts to harvest revenue from the net income of multinational enterprises. In this seminal case the United
States Supreme Court sustained the worldwide combined method
of income taxation as applied to a United States based parent corporation and its subsidiaries organized and operating in foreign
countries. The Court approved California's use of the "'unitary
business' principle"3 to bring into the parent corporation's tax base
the income of these foreign subsidiaries for the purpose of applying
the State's corporate franchise tax. This worldwide combined
method of reporting permits a taxing state to attribute part of the
total income of a multinational unitary enterprise, conducted by a
group of domestic and foreign corporations, to that state for tax
purposes.4
The Container decision will have a substantial effect on the
states' ability to tax multijurisdictional corporations, particularly
those domestic corporations with foreign subsidiaries incorporated
abroad.5 The decision is all the more significant because of the current Administration's philosophy of increasing the states' independence while concurrently cutting federal aid to states.6 This federalistic approach has left many states in severe financial straits;
thus, any decision that allows states to increase tax revenues in a
politically painless way will have profound effects.
1. The United States Supreme Court received 32 amicus briefs on the merits. The
Court decided the case by a five-to-three vote, with Justice Stevens recusing himself from
considering the case.
2. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
3. Id. at 2939. This Article traces the evolution of the unitary business principle in

parts II and II.
4. When States extend the unitary concept to include foreign corporations the approach is known as "worldwide combined reporting." ... Under worldwide combined
reporting a State applies its apportionment formula to the combined income of the
foreign corporate entities included in the unitary group with the income of the corporation(s) doing business in the State.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, KEY

IssuEs AFFECTING STATE TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CORPORATE

INCOME NEED

RESOLVING, GAO/GGD-82-38, at 31 (July 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
5. The success of the states with "worldwide combined reporting," sanctioned in
Container,established an important beachhead for the states in the taxation of foreign
source income. As of July 1, 1982, although only 13 states employed worldwide combined
reporting, 70% of the large corporations with foreign operations apparently did business in
states using this method. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at ii.
6. See City Lights Burn Less Bright, THE ECoNOMIST, Mar. 21, 1981, at 29.

19841

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

This Article explores the Supreme Court's treatment, leading
up to and including the Container decision, of state taxation of
corporate income from multinational operations. Part II highlights
the Court's development, prior to 1982, of the basic principles of
federal limitations on the states' taxing powers that guided its de7
Part III takes a more detailed look at two
cision in Container.
1982 Supreme Court cases, ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Commission8 and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue
Department,9 in which the states suffered a setback in their efforts
to extend the reach of their taxing powers over income from multinational businesses. Part IV dissects the Containeropinion, with
a more in-depth explanation of the Court's analysis and the dissenters' response, and concludes with a discussion of the issues
that the Container Court reserved for future decisions.10
II. DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO 1982 IN STATE TAXATION OF INCOME
FROM MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

State taxation of income from multinational operations has
evolved through a series of cases beginning with the United States
Supreme Court's 1924 decision in Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v.
State Tax Commission" and culminating in the 1983 Container
decision. In Bass the Court sustained a state tax on an apportioned
share of a single corporation's income from operations that extended across national boundaries. The complaining taxpayer
Bass, an English corporation12 that brewed ale in England and sold
it in the United States and elsewhere, raised due process objections
to the use of an apportionment formula for attributing taxpayer's
income to activities in the taxing State of New York, where ale was
sold. In sustaining the tax, the Court found that taxpayer's transnational operations were a "unitary business," which yielded no
profits until the process of manufacture in England resulted in
sales. Thus, the State justifiably could attribute to taxpayer's instate sales a fair proportion of the profits from the unitary business.'2 According to the Court, in taxation a state may
7. See infra notes 11-95 and accompanying text.
8. 458 U.S. 307 (1982). See infra notes 96-145 and accompanying text.
9. 458 U.S. 354 (1982). See infra notes 146-78 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 179-336 and accompanying text.
11. 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
12. In Bass no question regarding income from another corporation was present, since
the corporate taxpayer conducted all its operations as a single legal entity. See id. at 282.
13. Id.
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take into account property situated elsewhere when it "can be seen in some
plain and fairly intelligible way that it adds to the value of the [property] and
the rights exercised in the State." This is directly applicable to the carrying
on of a unitary business of manufacture and sale partly within and partly
without the State.1

Furthermore, the Court disregarded taxpayer's claim that it had
operated at a loss in the taxing State, finding "no sufficient reason
why a foreign corporation.

. .

should be relieved of a privilege tax

because it did not happen to have made any profit [from
business
'15
conducted in that state] during the [taxable] year.

The initial development of the unitary business principle as
the basis of apportionment and the fairness of formula requirement occurred primarily-with the notable exception of Bass-in
multistate situations, in which the taxpayer conducted its business
through branches or divisions, rather than through subsidiary corporations. While the concept of a unitary business as a prerequisite
for apportioning income from a multinationalbusiness emerged in
Bass, the Court gave little useful guidance on the criteria for determining the existence of a unitary business operation. Although the
Court still has not charted a "bright-line" test, in subsequent years
it has developed some judicial criteria for determining whether a
multistate or multinational enterprise is unitary for tax purposes. 16
In addition to the requirement that the taxpayer be a unitary
enterprise, the Court has demanded that the formula for apportioning income from multistate and multinational operations to the
taxing state must pass constitutional muster on the fairness of the
formula. The formula may violate the fairness requirements of the
due process and commerce clauses 17 if there is no "'rational relationship between the income attributed to the [taxing] State and
the intrastate values of the enterprises.' "18 To upset the tax on
fairness grounds, the objecting taxpayer must shoulder the burden
14. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920)).
15. Id. at 284.
16. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982);
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); infra notes 23-35, 47-52, 82-95,
113-45 & 157-78 and accompanying text.
17. Seemingly, both the commerce and the due process clauses play roles in this issue
of formula fairness. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 327 n.23,
328-29 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20, 227-28
(1980).
18. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 455 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980)).
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of proving that the income apportioned to the taxing state is
"' "out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted" in
the taxing State.' ",s This burden, however, is heavy. In only one
case has the Court invalidated a state net income tax imposed on
interstate operations because of the unfairness of the formula. In
20
the 1931 Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolinaex rel. Maxwell
decision, while recognizing the unitary character of taxpayer's multistate business, the Court unhorsed the net income tax because
taxpayer had met this burden of proving the formula unfair.2 1 Amplifying on what it regarded as unreasonable, the Court found that
the Hans Rees' formula attributed eighty-three percent of taxpayer's income to the taxing State, even though only seventeen
percent came from taxpayer's activities in that State.2 2
Later, in the multistate tax case of Butler Brothers v. McColgan,2 the Court blazed significant trails in its treatment of formulary attribution of income from a multistate unitary business. In
that opinion the Court more clearly articulated criteria that it continues to rely upon in determining the existence of a unitary business; in addition, the Court's review of the utilized apportionment
formula offers a clear indication of the difficulty that the taxpayer
faces in proving a formula unfair. The taxpayer in Butler Brothers
asserted that a California corporate franchise tax, measured by
taxpayer's apportioned net income, violated the due process clause
because it brought extraterritorial values within the reach of the
apportionment formula. Taxpayer (Butler Brothers) was a single
foreign corporation engaged in the wholesaling of dry goods and
general merchandise through seven wholesale distribution
branches, rather than through other corporations,located in seven
states. Butler Brothers was qualified to do business in the taxing
State, but its home office in Chicago, Illinois managed and controlled the business. Taxpayer acted as a middleman, purchasing
19. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 333-34 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220
(1980) (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135
(1931))).
Later the Court imposed two additional commerce clause hurdles that a state must
overcome in taxing income from multinational operations. The two hurdles are known as the
Japan Line doctrine. See infra notes 68-69 & 265-74 and accompanying text. For a fuller
discussion of JapanLine, see P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LocAL TAXATION § 2:17 (1981); J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 1 4.14 (1983).
20. 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
21. See id. at 135.
22. See id. at 134.
23. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
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from manufacturers and others, and then selling to retailers only.
As part of its corporate structure, Butler Brothers maintained in
Chicago a central buying division, which ordered goods for resale
from manufacturers, who in turn shipped the goods to the wholesale distributing houses in the seven states. Both parties stipulated
that because taxpayer bought and sold the goods in large
quanti24
ties, taxpayer was able to purchase them at a discount.
To determine the amount of the income attributable to the
taxing State for corporate franchise tax purposes, the State apportioned the taxable net income by using a three-factor property,
payroll, and sales formula. 25 Although taxpayer showed by its separate accounting" a loss of $82,851 for its wholesale distribution
store in the taxing State, its business as a whole (including all
branch distributing houses) produced a substantial profit. Thus,
the State applied its three-factor apportionment formula to the
multistate operations of the taxpayer on the ground that taxpayer
was a "unitary business.

'27

Taxpayer, however, contended that the

use of the formula resulted in converting a loss of $82,851 in the
taxing State into a profit of over $93,500 in that State, and that
the difference of some $175,000 either was created out of whole
cloth or had been appropriated by the taxing State from other
24. See id. at 508.
25. The "three-factor" or Massachusetts formula attributes a portion of the income
from a multistate business to a state for tax purposes by multiplying the total net income of
the multistate business by a fraction representing the arithmetic average of the values of the
business' property, payroll, and sales within the taxing state to those of the business as a
whole. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 429 (1980). The rationale of
the three-factor formula is that in a unitary multistate business, no method of assigning net
income can determine the exact amount of income attributable to any geographic area or to

any given part of a series of multistate business operations that culminate in the realization
of net income. The formula method of computing taxable income approximates the portion
of the business' income that is "reasonably related to the activities conducted within the
taxing State." Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978). The three-factor formula
is based on the assumption that the total income of a business enterprise results from certain income-producing factors-property, payroll, and sales. Thus, the formula attributes
the income produced by the combination of these factors to the state where these factors are
located. See P.

HARTMAN,

supra note 19, § 9:18.

26. The "separate accounting" method of assigning income from a unitary multistate
business to a state for tax purposes treats the business' operations within the taxing state as
an entity separate and distinct from the business' out-of-state operations. Since this method
considers the in-state operations as separate, it determines the income from the in-state

operations without reference to the success or failure of the multistate business' operations
in other states. The inherent difficulties of using separate accounting to isolate multistate or
multinational net income have prompted all the states with income taxes to adopt formula
apportionment methods. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 19, §§ 9:17-:18.
27. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. at 508.
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states.2" Thus, taxpayer insisted, the State was taxing extraterritorial values in violation of the due process clause.
The Butler Brothers Court was of a different persuasion. It
read the apportionment formula as "fairly calculated" to assign to
the taxing State that portion of the net income "reasonably attributable" to the business done in that State.29 In reaching its decision, the Court did not impeach the integrity of taxpayer's separate accounting method, which showed that the distributing
branch in the taxing State operated at a loss. The Court observed
that a particular accounting system, although "useful or necessary
as a business aid, may not fit the different requirements when a
State seeks to tax values created by business within its borders,"3 0
'
or "may not reveal the facts basic to the State's determination. ' 31
In the Court's view, the propriety of using the formula depended
upon whether taxpayer's entire multistate business enterprise
properly could be regarded as "unitary." Although the Court recognized that the seven divisions operated somewhat independently,3 2 it rejected taxpayer's position that each of them functioned as a free-standing operation, and not as part of a unitary
business. The Court held that taxpayer's total multistate operations constituted a "unitary enterprise" and that the taxing State
properly could apply the formula method of attributing income to
taxpayer's total net income.-" The operation of taxpayer's central
buying division by itself demonstrated to the Court that functionally the various branches were closely integrated." The central division purchased goods for resale at a lower price because it purchased large quantities. Taxpayer was able to buy in large
quantities only because it sold in large quantities. Since taxpayer's
store in the taxing State, although operating at a loss, contributed
to those sales, that in-state store helped taxpayer to obtain a
purchasing profit that benefitted taxpayer's business as a whole.3 5
Having determined that taxpayer's entire multistate enter28. Id. at 506.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 507.
31. Id. at 508 (citation omitted).
32. The Court was satisfied that "[e]ach of [Butler Brothers'] houses in the seven
states maintains stocks of goods, serves a separate territory, has its own sales force, handles
its own sales and all solicitation, credit and collection arrangements in connection therewith,
and keeps its own books of account." Id. at 504.
33. See id. at 508-09.
34. See id. at 508.
35. See id.
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prise constituted a "unitary business," the Court then directed its
attention to the fairness of the apportionment formula. Repelling a
due process clause attack, the Butler Brothers Court sustained the
amount of income attributed to the taxing State by the use of the
apportionment formula. The Court held that taxpayer had failed
to prove that the formula was arbitrary or unreasonable. Demonstrating the magnitude of the burden a taxpayer must shoulder in
order to derail a tax for unfairness of apportionment, the Court
concluded that the taxpayer had not met the "distinct burden of
showing by 'clear and cogent evidence' that [the formula as applied] results in extraterritorial values being taxed." 6 The Court
further observed that if factors which were responsible for taxpayer's net income were present in other states, but not present in
the taxing State, taxpayer had not revealed them.-7 The Court
took the position that, absent such proof, the taxing State justifiably could assume that the branch of business located within the
State "contributed its aliquot share to the advantages of centralized management of this unitary enterprise and to the net income
earned."3 Moreover, as the Court noted, "[n]or [were] there any
facts shown which permit[ted] the conclusion that the other advantages of centralized management [were] attributable to other
branches but not to the one in [the taxing state]." 39In essence, the
rationale of the Court in Butler Brothers seems to be that the benefits which a business derives from centralized management and
centralized bulk purchasing-more favorable prices-in any practical or realistic manner cannot be attributed to a particular state by
the separate accounting method; these benefits inseparably affect
the entire enterprise. 40 As the cases discussed below illustrate, the
Court expressly has embedded doctrines developed in Butler
36.

Id. at 507 (citation omitted). This language subsequently appeared in a number of

net income tax opinions in which the Court was not satisfied that the taxpayer had carried
the virtually insurmountable burden of proving that the apportionment formula produced
an unreasonable result. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,
221-22 (1980).
37. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. at 509.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. Id. at 508-09. For treatment of the origin and nature of the unitary concept, see P.
HARTMAN, supra note 19, § 2:4; J. HEL MSTEIN, supra note 19, 1 8.11; Dexter, The Unitary
Concept in State Income Taxation of Multistate-MultinationalBusinesses, 10 URB. LAW.
181 (1978); Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HAsTINGs L.J. 42 (1960). For a description of separate accounting and apportionment by
formula as methods of dividing the tax base for purposes of taxation, see P. HARTMAN, supra
note 19, §§ 9:16-:18; J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19,
8.3, 8.5, 9.1-.11.
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Brothers in its later opinions concerning taxation of income from
multinational business enterprises.4 1
The next significant case on taxation of income from multinational operations conducted through separate corporations was the
1980 decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes.4 2 In
Mobil the Court formalized the doctrine that "the linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitarybusiness principle. ' 43 The essential commercial and corporate facts
of Mobil are not complicated. The Mobil taxpayer, a New York
corporation with its commercial domicile in New York, engaged in
an integrated petroleum business, ranging from the exploration of
production reserves to the production, refining, transportation, distribution, and sale of petroleum and related products. Taxpayer
carried on its far-flung business in the United States and in a number of foreign countries; it conducted its operations abroad through
partly owned subsidiaries and affiliates, many of which were organized under the laws of foreign nations, and none of which conducted business in the taxing State (Vermont). Taxpayer's only activities in the taxing State consisted of wholesale and retail
selling.4 4
41. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 372 (1982);
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 327 n.23 (1982); Exxon Corp. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438, 442 (1980).
42. 445 U.S. 425 (1980). Elsewhere the author has analyzed Mobil more fully. See P.
HARTMAN, supra note 19, § 9:26. For other treatments of Mobil, see J. HELLERSTEiN, supra
note 19, 1 9.12[1]; Delap, From Moorman to Chicago Bridge; U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
Relating to "Unitary" Taxation, 2 J. STATE TAx'N 197, 201 (1983); Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of MultijurisdictionalCorporations:Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R.
5076, 79 MICH. L. Rv. 113 (1980).
43. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 439. (footnote omitted).
The Court since has applied the same principle in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 223 (Court considered only multistate business); in F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. at 362; in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,
458 U.S. at 319; and in the latest case, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.
Ct. 2933, 2940-41 (1983).
Similarly, since the "linchpin of apportionability" is the "unitary-business principle," as
a matter of due process, any apportionment formula applied to income from multinational
business enterprises must not reach wider than the scope of the "unitary business" operations. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S at 328-29; F.W. Woolworth
Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. at 372. In ASARCO and Woolworth the Court
held that intangible income-dividends, capital gains, and interest-of United States based
nondomiciliary parent corporations doing business in the taxing states, received from foreign organized and operated subsidiaries, was not apportionable business income because a
unitary enterprise did not exist. For a discussion of these two cases, see infra notes 96-178
and accompanying text.
44. 445 U.S. at 428.
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The taxing State included in the tax base to which it applied
the apportionment formula the dividends paid to taxpayer by the
subsidiaries and affiliates operating abroad. The propriety of the
inclusion in taxpayer's taxable income of these foreign source dividends was the issue in Mobil.
In resisting the tax, taxpayer claimed that the inclusion of the
foreign source dividend income in the tax base violated both the
due process and commerce clauses. Taxpayer took the view that
foreign source dividends were per se nonapportionable and, therefore, should be attributed in full to the state of taxpayer's commercial domicile (New York), which had no tax on this type of corporate income. Pursuant to this litigation strategy, taxpayer
apparently did not try to prove that it was not engaged in a unitary operation with the foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. Moreover, as the Court saw it, taxpayer had disclaimed and, therefore,
had waived any dispute with "the accuracy or fairness of [the] apportionment formula. ' '45 These positions adopted by the taxpayer
strongly affected the Court's decision by appreciably narrowing the
issues that the Court addressed. The Court did not consider
whether the application of the apportionment formula produced
unfair attribution of taxpayer's income to the taxing State, where
taxpayer only marketed its products." In short, the Court took the
position that taxpayer attacked only the tax base, and not the fairness of the apportionment.
In its due process attack, taxpayer urged that Vermont could
not tax the dividend income because no "nexus" existed between
that State and either taxpayer's management of its investments or
the business activities of the dividend payors-the subsidiaries and
affiliates. 47 The Court met this objection first by concluding that

Mobil was engaged in a unitary business with the dividend-paying
foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. The Court enunciated the general principle governing a state's apportionment and taxation of
income derived from an extraterritorial source, declaring that the
"linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is
the unitary-business principle.

' 48

In accord with the unitary busi-

ness principle, the Court pointed out that the complaining taxpayer, in order to establish that its dividends from subsidiaries and
affiliates were not subject to the apportioned tax under review,
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 434.
See id.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 439 (footnote omitted).
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needed to show "that its dividend income . .. was earned in the

course of activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products" in
the taxing jurisdiction."9 The Court noted that taxpayer had "offered no evidence that would undermine the conclusion that most,
if not all, of its subsidiaries and affiliates contribute to [taxpayer's]
worldwide petroleum enterprise.

' 50

The Mobil Court proceeded to

describe why taxpayer had not dislodged the State's application of
the unitary business principle:
Moreover, [taxpayer] has made no effort to demonstrate that the foreign operations of its subsidiaries and affiliates are distinct in any business or economic sense from its petroleum sales activities in [the taxing State]. Indeed,
all indications in the record are to the contrary, since it appears that these
foreign activities are part of [taxpayer's] integrated petroleum enterprise.
* * * Vermont was entitled to conclude that the dividend income's foreign
source did not destroy the requisite nexus with in-state activities.51

Since the Court found that taxpayer's sales activities in the taxing
State were an integral part of a unitary business enterprise, it declared that a sufficient nexus to justify apportionment existed.52
Having determined that taxpayer formed a unitary operation
with its taxpaying subsidiaries and affiliates, the Court next concluded that the form of business organization does not control the
determination of the underlying unity of the business operation. If
a unitary business exists when a particular corporation conducts its
business through branches or divisions, the Court felt that a unitary business presumably also would exist if that corporation conducts its business through subsidiaries and affiliates.
Superficially, intercorporate division might appear to be a more attractive basis for limiting apportionability. But the form of business organizationmay
have nothing to do with the underlying unity or diversity of business enter-

prise. Had appellant chosen to operate its foreign subsidiaries as separate
divisions of a legally as well as a functionally integrated enterprise, there is
little doubt that the income derived from those divisions would meet due
process requirements for apportionability. . . . Transforming the same income into dividends from legally separate entities works no change in the
underlying economic realities of a unitary business, and accordingly it ought

not to affect the apportionability of income the parent receives. 5s

The Mobil Court did not go so far as to say that all dividend
income which a corporation receives is taxable in every state where
that corporation does business. The Court recognized that when
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 435.
Id. at 439-40 (emphasis added).
See id. at 441.
Id. at 440-41 (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted).
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the business activities of the dividend-paying subsidiaries and affiliates have nothing to do with the activities of the dividend recipient in the taxing state, then no underlying unitary business exists
and, therefore, no sufficient nexus to satisfy due process requirements is present.5 4 In such a case, courts must deny apportionment. The Mobil Court, however, was of the opinion that taxpayer
had failed to sustain its "burden of proving any unrelated business
activity on the part of its subsidiaries and affiliates that would
raise the question of nonapportionability." 5 As a consequence, the
Court held that taxpayer had not shown its foreign source dividends to be exempt, as a matter of due process, from apportionment for income tax purposes by the State of Vermont.
Although the Mobil Court did not consider whether the apportionment formula produced an unfair result," a fairness issue
might well have been present but for taxpayer's alleged waiver of
that issue. In applying the apportionment formula to Mobil's income, the taxing State had included in the tax base dividends from
taxpayer's foreign subsidiaries and affiliates; however, in the denominator of the apportionment fraction the State did not permit
the inclusion of the subsidiaries' and affiliates' sales, payroll, and
property. Of course, the omission of these elements resulted in a
larger apportionment fraction and, consequently, in greater shares
of income attributable to the taxing State.5 This omission could
lead one to question the fairness of the formula under the due process clause. Indeed, Justice Stevens questioned the formula's fairness in dissent, arguing that taxpayer had not waived its due process objections to the application of the formula and that the State
had overtaxed Mobil by failing to include the sales, payroll, and
property values of the subsidiaries in the apportionment formula
computations.5 ' Thus, the Court left unresolved the question of
whether the standard formula factors of the subsidiaries and affiliates paying dividend income to a taxed corporation in a unitary
enterprise must be included in the apportionment formula.
54. See id. at 441-42.
55. Id. at 442.
56. See supra text accompanying note 45.
57. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
58. See 445 U.S. at 461-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For other views that the apportionment factors in the formula should be adjusted by taking into account the property,
payroll, and sales of the payor subsidiaries and affiliates, see Feinschreiber, State Taxation
of Foreign Dividends After Mobil v. Vermont- Adjusting the Apportionment Formula, 6
INT'L TAX J. 267 (1980); Nackenson, The Impact of Mobil v. Vermont on Interstate Taxation, 6 INT'L TAX J. 323 (1980).

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

1984]

229

In addition to mounting the due process clause attack, the
Mobil taxpayer also thought Vermont's tax constituted an impingement of the commerce clause, in that the tax impermissibly
burdened both interstate and foreign commerce by exposing taxpayer's income to a substantial risk of multiple taxation. 59 Addressing the interstate commerce clause question first, the Court
rejected taxpayer's efforts to establish a constitutional principle
that a taxing state cannot include foreign source dividends in apportionable business income and that such income shall be attributed totally to the parent-payee's commercial domicile." Since
New York, the state of Mobil's commercial domicile, did not tax
the dividends, taxpayer could not show actual multiple taxation
among the states. To the Court the risk of multiple state taxation
apparently was not enough. The Court commented that "there is
nothing talismanic about the concepts of 'business situs' or 'commercial domicile' "that automatically makes those concepts constitutionally controlling in determining a single state that can tax income from intangibles. 1 The Court assumed that the state of
commercial domicile does have a taxable grip on taxpayer's dividend income, but it saw no reason why that power should "be exclusive when the dividends reflect income from a unitary business,
part of which is conducted" in states other than the state of commercial domicile. 2 In such a situation, the Court explained that
the dividend income "bears relation to benefits and privileges conferred by several States."6 - When a business enterprise is unitary,
the Court noted, apportionment is ordinarily the accepted method
of dividing income from a multistate operation among the states."
In such circumstances, "separate accounting, while it purports to
isolate portions of income received in various States, may fail to
account for contributions to income resulting from functional inte' 65
gration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.
Since "these factors of profitability arise from the operation of the
business as a whole, it becomes misleading," said the Court, "to
characterize the income of the business as having a single indentifi59.
60.

J.

445 U.S. at 442.
For the reasons for allocating all dividends to the state of commercial domicile, see

HELLERSTEIN, INTERSTATE TAXATION

61.

445 U.S. at 445.

62. Id. at 445-46.
63. Id. at 446.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 438.

547 (1983).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:217

able 'source." "66
In its impingement of foreign commerce challenge, taxpayer
pressed the contention that because of the risk of multiple taxation abroad, allocation of foreign source dividend income to a single state is required at home. 7 Taxpayer relied on the rationale of
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,6 8 in which the Court
upset a property tax that Los Angeles County levied on ocean-going, cargo-carrying vehicles of foreign commerce owned by a Japanese corporation domiciled in Japan and already subject to a Japanese property tax. The Japan Line Court used a two-pronged
rationale in finding the tax on these instrumentalities of foreign
commerce constitutionally impermissible. First, the Court concluded that it could not prevent duplicative taxation since it had
no power over the taxing foreign jurisdiction of Japan. Second, the
Court found the Japan Line tax impermissible because the tax
prevented the federal government from speaking with one voice
when dealing with foreign nations in commercial relations. The
Mobil taxpayer urged that the Vermont tax violated both prongs
69
of the JapanLine test.
The Mobil Court did not find the Japan Line arguments persuasive, however, and it rejected the argument for a number of reasons. One principal reason, as the Court saw it, was that the Mobil
taxpayer had attempted to focus attention on the effect of foreign
taxation, when the effect of domestic taxation was the only real
issue in Mobil.7 0 The Mobil taxpayer had conceded, thought the
Court, that states have taxing power over the foreign source income at issue when taxpayer claimed that the state of commercial
domicile should be able to tax the foreign source dividends in
full.7 1 That concession, said the Mobil Court, meant that taxpayer
"necessarily forgoes any contention that local duplication of foreign taxes is proscribed." 72 Furthermore, the Court pointed out
that acceptance of taxpayer's argument, insisting on total allocation of its foreign source dividend income to the state of commer66. Id. To support this position, the Court relied on Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924) (discussed supra notes 11-15 and accompanying
text).
67. 445 U.S. at 446.
68. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
69. For a fuller discussion of Japan Line, see P. HARTMAN, supra note 19, § 2:17; J.
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, 1 4.10[2]. See also infra notes 257-94 and accompanying text.
70. 445 U.S. at 447.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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cial domicile, would provide no guarantee of a lesser domestic tax
burden on dividend income from foreign sources. By taxpayer's
own argument and admission, total allocation would give the state
of commercial domicile the power to tax the foreign source dividend income in full, without regard to the extent of taxation
abroad.7 3 In other words the Court felt that, under normal circumstances, income fairly apportioned among the states in which taxpayer conducted business would not necessarily be any more burdensome than a tax on the same income allocated in full to the
state of commercial domicile. 4
In sum, the Mobil Court rejected the Japan Line arguments
because JapanLine concerned actual multiple taxation of foreign
commerce, while Mobil concerned only the potential multiple taxation of commerce among the states. Further, as the Mobil opinion
points out, Japan Line concerned a tax on property of a Japanese
corporation conducting foreign commerce; in Mobil, the tax was on
income of a United States corporation. To the Mobil Court this
distinction seemed important, 5 as it did in the 1983 Container
6
7

case.

Less than three months after Mobil, the Court expanded and
sharpened judicial thinking about the unitary business concept
and tax apportionment in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department
of Revenue.7 Although the taxpayer in Exxon was a multinational
corporation, that decision addressed taxation of multistate, rather
than multinational, commerce. Taxpayer, organized under the laws
of Delaware and with general offices located in Houston, Texas,
was a vertically integrated petroleum company that performed
only marketing operations in the taxing State of Wisconsin. Taxpayer's corporate structure consisted of three main functional departments-exploration and production, refining, and marketing-each operating independently of the others. Transfers among
these independent functional departments were at "arms length"
prices. 78 These three functional departments, however, operated
under the supervision of a higher level of management.7 9
73. Id.
74. Id. In Mobil, of course, allocation to the commercial domicile would have permitted taxpayer to escape all state taxation since the State of commercial domicile had no
income tax that would apply to this income. Id. at 444.
75. Id. at 444-46.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 2952. See infra notes 281-99 and accompanying text.
77. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
78. See id. at 212.
79. See id. at 224.
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Taking the position that Exxon's petroleum operations constituted a unitary business, Wisconsin applied its three-factor (property, payroll, and sales) apportionment formula to taxpayer's total
operating income.80 Taxpayer reported losses from its activities in
the taxing State, but had an overall profit from all of its operations."' Since taxpayer engaged in only marketing operations in the
taxing State, it urged that these operations did not provide a sufficient nexus with the State to satisfy due process requirements.
Consequently, taxpayer maintained, the taxing State lacked constitutional power to bring all three departments' corporate income
within the tax base that was subject to formula apportionment,
Specifically, taxpayer claimed that income from the out-of-state
exploration and production departments should be geographically
allocated entirely to the situs states. The inclusion of income from
these operations, taxpayer argued, would violate the due process
clause.
The Exxon Court turned back taxpayer's due process attack,
finding that taxpayer's marketing operations in the taxing State
constituted an integral part of one unitary business enterprise, and
thus established a sufficient nexus to subject all of taxpayer's income to apportionment. In rejecting taxpayer's argument that separate functional accounting should be used to compute the income
earned in the various states, the Court noted that such a method of
attributing income fails to account for income arising from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of
scale.82 While such accounting may be useful for internal auditing,
said the Court, for tax purposes it is not required by the
Constitution."8
Repeating from Mobil that the "'linchpin of apportionability'" for state income taxation of an interstate enterprise is the
"'unitary-business principle,' "8" the Exxon Court agreed with the
State court that the Exxon enterprise constituted a unitary opera80. The taxing State did exclude from taxpayer's total income that income derived
from the sale of crude oil and gas at the wellhead to third parties. Id. at 226 n.10.
81. In two earlier cases the Court found unitary operations and upheld application of
apportionment formulae to taxpayers' total incomes, even though an individual branch of
each business reported a loss. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942) (discussed
supra notes 23-40 and accompanying texts); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924) (discussed supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text).
82. 447 U.S. at 222.
83. Id. at 222-23.
84. Id. at 223 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 439-42).
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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tion. Taxpayer had not carried the burden of showing that its
functional departments were "'discrete business enterprises,' 85
whose incomes constitutionally lay beyond the reach of the apportionment statute. As the Exxon Court stressed, "While Exxon may
treat its operational departments as independent profit centers, it
is nonetheless true that this case involves a highly integrated business which benefits from an umbrella of centralized management
and controlled interaction." 86 Among the considerations in the
characterization of Exxon as a unitary enterprise was its central
purchasing office in Houston, Texas, which purchased many of the
items that taxpayer sold in the taxing State, and whose purpose
was to increase overall profits by obtaining the benefit of bulk
purchases and efficient allocation of supplies among dealers.87 The
Court riveted down the State's contention that Exxon's marketing
activities in the taxing State constituted an integral part of its unitary business by quoting from the testimony of an Exxon official
regarding "the important link among the three main operating
departments": 88
"So, in the case of the petroleum industry ... where you have high capital
investments in refineries, the existence of an assured supply of raw materials
and crude is important and the assured and stable outlet for products is important, and therefore ... when these segments are under a single corporate
entity, it provides for some assurance that the risk of disruptions in refining
operations are minimized due to supply and demand imbalances that may
occur from time to time." 89

The Exxon taxpayer also had a commerce clause arrow in its
quiver with which it undertook to shoot down the Wisconsin income tax. Taxpayer argued that the commerce clause, seemingly in
order to prevent prohibited cumulative taxation, required that all
income derived from its exploration and production department be
allocated to the states where the production centers were located,
and not be included in total net income for application of the apportionment formula. The Court disagreed.9 0
In sustaining the tax, the Court first measured the practical
effect of the tax according to the four-pronged test formalized in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady."1 Applying the four guide85.
86.
87.
88.

447 U.S. at 224 (quoting Mobile, 445 U.S. at 439).
Id.
See id.
Id.

89. Id. at 225 (quoting testimony in Appendix at 224-25).
90.

See id. at 227-30.

91. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). That landmark case enunciated a four-pronged test for deter-
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lines of that case, the Exxon Court concluded that the tax had a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, was fairly apportioned, did
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and was fairly related to the services provided by the taxing State.2 The Court did
not agree that the challenged taxing statute subjected taxpayer's
interstate business to forbidden duplicative taxation by failing to
allocate to the situs states all the income from exploration and production. Taxpayer had shown no actual multiple taxation, but only
the risk of multiple tax burdens not borne by local business.93 The
risk of duplicative taxation was not a sufficient basis for striking
94
down the tax on commerce clause grounds, concluded the Court.
Thus, the Court recognized that the situs states of taxpayer's production centers should be permitted to tax some, but not all, of the
income derived from that production because the production centers were an integral part of a unitary business, part of which was
conducted in other states that conferred benefits and protection on
the business."
III. ASARCO

AND

Woolworth

Prior to the appearance of ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho Tax Commission98 and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department97 on the judicial horizon, the states had been spectacularly successful in withstanding constitutional challenges to their
efforts to impose income taxes on multistate and multinational enterprises by using formulary apportionment of corporate income.
Relying on the premise that the "linchpin of apportionability" is
the "unitary-business principle,"98 the Court sustained the appormining valid taxation in interstate commerce. Under Complete Auto Transit no state tax
concerning interstateoperations will pass constitutional muster unless the tax satisfies each
of the four parts of the test. The tax will fall unless it (1) is "applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State"; (2) is "fairly apportioned"; (3) "does not discriminate against interstate commerce"; and (4) is "fairly related to the services provided by the
[taxing] State." Id. at 279. For a fuller analysis of Complete Auto Transitby the author, see
P. HARTMAN, supra note 19, § 2:17.
92. 447 U.S. at 228-30.
93. See id. at 228.
94. See id. at 228-29 & n.12.
95. See id. at 229. For further comments on Exxon by the author, see P. HARTMAN,
supra note 19, §§ 9:28-:29. For other treatments of Exxon, see J. HELLERSTEiN, supra note

19, 1 8.11 [4][b]; Delap, supra note 42, at 203.
96.
97.

458 U.S. 307 (1982).
458 U.S. 354 (1982).

98. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 223 (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 439). See supra notes notes 43 & 84 and accompanying text.
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tionment. The assailing taxpayers had met their Waterloo because
not once, prior to ASARCO and Woolworth, had any of them carried the judicially imposed burden of proving that its multistate,
or multinational0 0 operation was a "discrete business enterprise"' 0 1 and not a unitary business. Furthermore, more than a half
century had passed since the Court had struck down a tax because
the apportionment formula attributed to the taxing state income
"out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by
[taxpayer] in that State." 102
In ASARCO and Woolworth the states received a major setback in their efforts to tax corporate income from multinational
operations. The taxpayers in ASARCO and Woolworth took the
position that, unlike the taxpayers in Mobil' and Exxon, 0 4 they
had proven that their multijurisdictional enterprises were not a
part of a unitary business, but instead were "discrete business enterprises." The Supreme Court agreed. Applying the unitary business principle the Court found that, for corporate income tax apportionment purposes, neither of the nondomiciliary corporations
doing business in the taxing States conducted a unitary business
with its out-of-state subsidiaries and affiliates. Consequently, the
Court held in each case that the taxing State's inclusion within the
apportionable tax base of certain income'05 from taxpayer's subsidiaries and affiliates violated the due process clause because the
business activities of the income payors (subsidiaries and affiliates)
were not sufficiently connected to the activities of the income recipient to constitute a unitary business. The Court thus converted
the unitary business principle into a due process limitation on
state taxing power.
Since the Court found no unitary business
relationship in either ASARCO or Woolworth, it did not reach the
controversial issue of the fairness of the apportionment formula.
ASARCO and Woolworth are noteworthy for two principal
reasons. First, in those cases a taxpayer succeeded for the first
99. See Exxon, 447 U.S. at 219; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 269 (1978);
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 504 (1942).
100. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 439; Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 278 (1924).
101. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 439.
102. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931).
103. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
104. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
105. The income in question was from dividends, interest, and capital gains from the
sale of stock. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 328-30; F.W. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 359.
106. See The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 87 (1982).
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time in putting into the record proof sufficient to satisfy the Court
that, for the purpose of corporate income taxation, taxpayer's multijurisdictional operations actually comprised discrete business enterprises. Second, one of the most significant aspects of these two
cases is the Court's rejection on due process grounds of the virtually all-inclusive scope of the taxing states' concept of a unitary
business. Because the taxing states in both cases had adopted the
unitary concept in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA),0 7 which is embodied in the Multistate Tax
Compact, 10 8 the Court in effect declared the provisions of UDITPA
pertaining to the unitary business principle unconstitutional as applied in those cases.
A. ASARCO
At issue in ASARCO was the constitutionality of Idaho's corporate income taxes levied on income that a nondomiciliary corporation received from five foreign-based corporations in which the
corporation owned major interests. Taxpayer, incorporated in New
Jersey and commercially domiciled in New York, engaged in the
mining, smelting, and refining of nonferrous metals, such as copper, gold, silver, lead, and zinc, in a number of states. ASARCO
received three types of intangible income-dividends, interest, and
capital gains-from its five foreign-based subsidiaries,10 9 none of
which conducted any business within the taxing State. Using its
version of UDITPA, Idaho apportioned "business"" 0 income according to the three-factor formula of properly, payroll, and sales.
In computing its tax on ASARCO's net income, the taxing State
107. 7A U.L.A. 93 (1978) [hereinafter cited as UDITPA].
108. See Multistate Tax Compact, art. IV, § 1(b), reprinted in 1 ST. & Loc. TAX.
SERV., All States Unit (P-H) 1 6310, 6315.10 (1975). The adoption by Idaho, the taxing
State in ASARCO, appears in IDAHO CODE §§ 63-3027-3701 (1976 & Supp. 1982). The adoption by New Mexico, the taxing State in Woolworth, is found in N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-4-1 to
-21 (1983).
109. Taxpayer owned about 53% of the stock of M.I.M. Holding, Ltd.; 34% of the
stock of both General Cable and Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.; 49% of the stock of
ASARCO Mexicana, S.A.; and 51.5% of the stock of Southern Peru Copper Corp. 458 U.S.
at 309 n.2. The auditor of ASARCO's tax returns treated ASARCO and its six wholly owned
subsidiaries as unitary and required a combined report with the parent. The treatment of
these six subsidiaries was not an issue before the Supreme Court. Id. at 312.
110. Under its version of UDITPA, Idaho classified corporate income from intangible
property as either "business" or "nonbusiness" income. "Business" income included income
from intangible property when "'acquisition, management, or disposition [of the property]
constitute[s] integral or necessary parts of the taxpayers' trade or business operations.' "Id.
at 310 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 63-3027 (1976 & Supp. 1981) (footnote omitted).
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included this intangible income in ASARCO's tax base. ASARCO's
challenge of the Idaho tax relied on two main due process and
commerce clause arguments. Its threshold argument was that the
taxing State could not include the dividends, interest, and capital
gains in its taxable income because this income was not derived
from a "unitary business." The activities of the five payors outside
the taxing State, ASARCO claimed, were not functionally integrated with the activities of the taxpayer-recipient within the taxing state."' Taxpayer's alternative argument was that if the Court
should find a unitary operation, then the tax still would contravene
the due process and commerce clauses unless Idaho adjusted the
regular apportionment formula to reflect the out-of-state property,
payroll, and sales of the out-of-state subsidiaries and affiliates that
generated the income. 112 The Court never reached this second argument since it found that no unitary operation existed. Hence,
the state could not include dividend income from the foreign-based
subsidiaries in taxpayer's tax base.
According to the rationale of earlier cases, 113 the existence of a
unitary business relationship between ASARCO and the five subsidiaries and affiliates was an essential prerequisite to Idaho's taxation of this foreign source income. Idaho agreed that the intangible
income payors "were not engaged in a single unitary business with
ASARCO.'114 Instead, to justify its taxation of this income, Idaho

urged the Court to expand the concept of unitary business; the
taxing State proposed that corporate purpose should define the
unitary business principle. 11 5 Using its modified version of
UDITPA, Idaho maintained that the intangible income in question
should be treated as income from a unitary business simply because the intangible property was" 'acquired, managed or disposed
of for purposes relating or contributing to the taxpayer's business.'

",j6

In its oral argument Idaho urged that income from in-

tangible property be considered part of a unitary business when
the intangibles "contribute or relate to or are in some way in fur111. Brief for Appellant at 8-9, ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S.
307 (1982).
112. Brief for Appellant, supra note 111, at 9.
113. See supra notes 11-95 and accompanying text.
114. Brief for Appellee at 29, ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307
(1982).
115. 458 U.S. at 325-26.
116. 458 U.S. at 326 (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 4); see supra note
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therance of the taxpayer's own trade or business.1 117 Since the business use of the foreign source dividends constituted part of
ASARCO's own unitary business of mining, smelting, and refining
minerals, Idaho argued, the minimal connection to satisfy due process requirements was present. 118 Consequently, the taxing State
concluded that it should treat this income the same as any other
business income and, thus, could apportion the income among
those states in which ASARCO conducted its unitary business. 119
In reversing the Idaho Supreme Court's decision upholding
the tax on ASARCO, the Court flatly rejected the taxing State's
argument that the concept of a unitary business-with its concomitant doctrine of apportionability of income from intangible property-is applicable when the intangibles are simply "'acquired,
managed or disposed of for purposes relating or contributing to the
taxpayer's business.' "120 The Court refused to accept Idaho's position that the use of an intangible asset in ASARCO's own unitary
business was sufficient to make income from that asset apportionable to the taxpayer; in the Court's eyes, the taxing State's "definition of unitary business would destroy the concept" of unitary business as the Court had developed it.' 2 ' The Court observed that
"all of [ASARCO's] operations, including any investment made, in
some sense can be said to be 'for purposes related to or contributing to the [corporation's] business.' ,,122 "When pressed to its logical limit, this conception of the 'unitary business' limitation becomes no limitation at all," thought the ASARCO Court.123 To be
sure, said the Court, "it is plain that the five dividend-paying subsidiaries 'add to the riches' of ASARCO. But it is also true that
they are 'discrete business enterprise[s]' that-in 'any business or
economic sense'- have 'nothing to do with the activities' of
ASARCO in Idaho.' 124 The Court instead took the position that
the existence of a unitary business turns upon the relationship between the business of the payor of the income (the five subsidiaries
and affiliates) and the recipient of the income (ASARCO). 2 5
117.
Comm'n,
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Transcript of Oral Argument of Appellee at 25, ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
458 U.S. 307 (1982).
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 4 (emphasis added).
Id. at 29.
458 U.S. at 326 (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 4).
Id. at 326.
Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 4).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 328 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439-42).
For a succinct, clear-cut summary of the Court's position, see Hanson, ASARCO
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The ASARCO Court purported to follow the principles articulated in Mobil and Exxon in deciding whether the State could include the disputed income at issue in ASARCO's taxable income
for apportionment purposes.128 The Court agreed that ASARCO
had succeeded, where the taxpayers in Mobil and Exxon had
failed, in its efforts to prove that the dividend payors were not part
of a unitary business, but instead were "discrete business enterprises. '127 Thus, a significant aspect of ASARCO is the Court's
conclusion that ASARCO-unlike the taxpayers in Mobil and Exxon-had placed in the record sufficient actual proof to convince
the Court that ASARCO and its subsidiaries were not a unitary
business for tax purposes. Also significant was the ASARCO
Court's almost total reliance on findings of fact, principally by the
trial court, to determine that a unitary business did not exist between ASARCO and its dividend-paying subsidiaries.
In finding no unitary business, the Court focused on two criteria-functional integration and management control. The main
emphasis in the Court's opinion, however, seems to be on management control by ASARCO, rather than on functional integration
between ASARCO and its five subsidiaries and affiliates. The
ASARCO opinion appears to make the absence of active managerial control a key reason for the finding of no unitary business;s
the potential ability to control and operate a company was not dispositive of the unitary issue, in the Court's view. The discussion of
ASARCO's relationship with its subsidiary, Southern
Peru' 29-which the Court thought presented the closest question
of a unitary business' 510 -illustrates the Court's emphasis on active
managerial control. ASARCO, one of four shareholders of Southern
Peru, owned 51.5% of its stock. The four shareholders bought 7080% of Southern Peru's copper output, with about 35% of that
output going to ASARCO under a long-term contract at published
market prices, over which ASARCO had no control.' 31 Approxiand Woolworth-Refining Mobil and the "Unitary Business" Test for Apportioning Intangible Income, 1 J. STATE TAX'N 197, 201-04 (1982).
126. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 223; Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 439. As discussed above, those cases enunciated the
doctrine that the "linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the
unitary-business principle." Id. See supra notes 43 & 84 and accompanying text.
127. 458 U.S. at 328.
128. Id. at 322-24.
129. Id. at 320-22.
130. Id. at 320.
131. Id. at 320 21.
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mately 30% of Southern Peru's copper production went to European customers through Southern Peru Copper Sales Corporation,
in which ASARCO owned 51.5% of the stock.1" 2 The entire staff of
the Sales Corporation consisted of ASARCO employees, whom
ASARCO reimbursed for sales services on a commission basis.1 33
If ASARCO had asserted its majority interest in Southern
Peru, of course it could have controlled the management of that
subsidiary. ASARCO, however, had entered into a management
agreement, which the Court thought effectively insured that
ASARCO would be unable to exercise actual control over the subsidiary. Under this agreement ASARCO had the power to name
only six of the thirteen members on the board of directors of
Southern Peru. Under Southern Peru's bylaws, however, eight
votes were necessary to pass any resolution. Additionally, any
change in Southern Peru's bylaws required a unanimous vote of all
four shareholders.1 34 To be sure, ASARCO could not directly compel affirmative action by Southern Peru, but ASARCO's power
over Southern Peru, as Justice O'Connor pointedly observed in her
vigorous dissent, "gave it unilateral veto power over all corporate
decisions, including those supported unanimously by all other
shareholders.' 3 5 Thus, ASARCO's six members of the thirteen
member board could stymie completely any affirmative board action, since eight votes were necessary to take action.
Because ASARCO had the power to veto all corporate business decisions, and because it had a stranglehold on 35 % of Southern Peru's copper output, perhaps it was not necessary that
ASARCO be in a position to exercise its power so openly, formally,
and affirmatively in order to make that power felt or to have its
wishes pursued. Nevertheless, to the Court, "control potential to
manage" was not enough control to constitute a unitary business. 138 That the Court may not have given enough weight to
ASARCO's negative control over Southern Peru might plausibly
and realistically be argued. The ASARCO Court relied on conclusory, self-serving opinions by ASARCO officials that ASARCO
did not "controf Southern Peru in any sense of that term," and
that Southern Peru did not "seek direction or approval from
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 321 n.16.
Id.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 340 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
458 U.S. at 322.
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ASARCO on major decisions.

' 13 7

Idaho did not dispute any of

these facts, according to the Court. 138 The Court concluded, "In
view of the findings and the undisputed facts, . . . ASARCO's

Idaho silver mining and Southern Peru's autonomous business are
insufficiently connected to permit the two companies to be classified as a unitary business.' 39
The ASARCO Court professed to have been unable to find
sufficient functional integration to warrant finding a unitary operation, since the "continuous flow and interchange of common products" that existed in Exxon and Mobil were absent. 4 ° As Justice
O'Connor emphasized in dissent, however, ASARCO's control of
Southern Peru "evidently helped to assure ASARCO of supplies of
unrefined copper, since 35% of the entire copper output of Southern Peru was sold to ASARCO."'' Additionally, ASARCO's 51.5%
interest in Southern Peru Copper Sales Corporation, which sold
approximately 30% of Southern Peru's copper supply to European
customers, 42 assured ASARCO of a "continuous" supply of Southern Peru's output of refined copper and gave ASARCO power to
control the sale of a substantial additional amount of Southern
Peru's copper output. The Court previously had noted the importance of assured supplies and markets in Exxon; in finding a unitary operation, the Exxon Court pointed out that taxpaying business executives have recognized that assured and stable supplies
and markets minimize risks of disruption of operations caused by
"'supply and demand imbalances that may occur from time to
time.' ,,14s Doubtless, such assurances of supplies and markets not
infrequently are the reasons for these investments. Given that
ASARCO and Southern Peru were in the same business, is it beyond the pale of reasonableness to suggest that ASARCO's grip on
35% of Southern Peru's copper output, when coupled with its absolute negative control over Southern Peru, could assure ASARCO
of "stable supplies" of unrefined copper and, thus, could minimize
risks of disruption caused by periodic imbalances of supply and
demand? Justice O'Connor, dissenting, found this "assured sup137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 329-30 n.24.
141. Id. at 343 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
142. 458 U.S. at 321 n.16.
143. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 225 (quoting testimony
in Appendix at 224-25).
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plies" aspect of the case a cogent reason for deciding that
ASARCO and Southern Peru did constitute a unitary operation.'
Moreover, as the dissent properly pointed out, the burden rested
on the taxpayer (ASARCO) to show that its holdings in the subsidiaries were not part of a unitary business enterprise. 1 45
B.

Woolworth

The Court heard F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue
Department'46 in tandem with ASARCO. Like Idaho in ASARCO,
New Mexico, the taxing State in Woolworth, had adopted a version
of UDITPA 47 and had joined the Multistate Tax Compact. 148
Under the New Mexico version of UDITPA, "business" income
was apportioned, as in ASARCO, using the three-factor formula of
property, payroll, and sales. 149 Much like the statute in Idaho, 50
under the New Mexico statute apportionable "business" income
included income from both tangible and intangible property "if the
acquisition, management and disposition of the property constitute[d] integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business
5
operations."' '
The Woolworth taxpayer, with principal place of business and
commercial domicile in New York, engaged in retail business
through chain stores in the United States and elsewhere. Additionally, Woolworth had four subsidiaries in several foreign countries;
144. 458 U.S. at 343 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. 458 U.S. at 334-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 439-40. For a lengthy, incisive, and sharply critical analysis
of ASARCO, see Floyd, The "Unitary" Business in State Taxation: Confusion at the Supreme Court?, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 465, 486-87 (asserting that because of ASARCO's negative control over and substantial supply relationship with Southern Peru, the Court was
wrong in not finding a unitary relationship between ASARCO and Southern Peru). For further comment on ASARCO and Woolworth by the author, see P. HARTMAN, supra note 19, §
9:30 (Supp. 1983). For additional textual comments on ASARCO and Woolworth, see J.
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19,
8.11[4][a], [c], [d], [e]. For legal periodical comments on
ASARCO and Woolworth, see Delap, supra note 42, at 206; Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of MultijurisdictionalCorporations,PartII: Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth,
81 MICH. L. REv. 157 (1982); Seago, The Revitalization of the Unitary Business Principle-ASARCO and Woolworth, 1 J. STATE TAX'N 101, 112 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1981
Term, supra note 106, at 86-96.
146. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
147. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-4-1 to -21 (1982).
148. Id. §§ 7-5-1 to -7.
149. Id. § 7-4-10. See 458 U.S. at 357 n.3. For an explanation of the three-factor
formula, see supra note 25.
150. See supra note 110.
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-4-2(A) (1981). See 458 U.S. at 357 n.2.
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they, too, engaged in chain store retailing in those countries. None
of the four conducted any business in the taxing State. Three of
these subsidiaries were wholly owned, and in the fourth Woolworth
owned a 52.7% interest. Because it operated stores in the taxing
State of New Mexico, Woolworth was subject to that State's corporate income tax. In imposing its apportioned income tax on
Woolworth, New Mexico had included in Woolworth's apportionable income the dividends that taxpayer had received from its four
foreign subsidiaries doing business abroad under the Woolworth
name.15" In Woolworth the broad issue was the same as in
ASARCO: whether New Mexico, consistent with the due process
clause, had the power to tax as business income the dividend income from these foreign subsidiaries. The Woolworth taxpayer argued that the due process clause precluded New Mexico from including the foreign source dividends in Woolworth's apportionable
business income. Alternatively, Woolworth argued-as did the
ASARCO taxpayer-that if the dividends could be included, then
the State must adjust the apportionment formula to reflect a pro
rata portion of the property, payroll, and sales of the foreign subsidiaries paying the dividends. The Court never reached this second argument in ASARCO or Woolworth.
Reversing the New Mexico Supreme Court decision that upheld the tax, the United States Supreme Court held that the inclusion of the dividends from the four foreign subsidiaries in
Woolworth's apportionable income contravened the due process
clause. The Woolworth Court noted that after the State supreme
court had identified the existence of a unitary business relationship as the "key question," that court had "proceeded to resolve
this question largely by emphasizing thepotentials of the relationship between Woolworth and its subsidiaries.""15 In essence, the
152. Also included in Woolworth's taxable income was a sum known as "gross up,"
which is a figure that the federal government "deemed" Woolworth to have received for
purposes of a foreign tax credit on its federal income tax calculation, but which Woolworth
never actually received. 458 U.S. at 358. The same due process clause constraints that prevented New Mexico from taxing the foreign source dividends also prevented it from taxing
the "gross up." Id. at 372-73.
153. 458 U.S. at 363. The New Mexico Supreme Court had quoted a United States
Supreme Court case that upheld a federal excise tax on corporate income:
The possession of large assets by subsidiaries is a business advantage of great value to
the parent; "it may give credit which will result in more economical business methods;
it may give a standing which shall facilitate purchases; it may enable the corporation to
enlarge the field of its activities and in many ways give it business standing and
prestige."
Taxation and Revenue Dep't v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 95 N.M. 519, 529, 624 P.2d 28, 38
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State court's rationale for dividend apportionment had been that
the mere possession of large assets-Woolworth's holdings in the
stock of the subsidiaries-might enhance Woolworth's credit
standing and its purchasing power, thus enabling Woolworth to enlarge its operations and to acquire standing and prestige for its
business. The Woolworth Court, however, rejected this reasoning
and held that no unitary operation existed between Woolworth
and its foreign subsidiaries. The Court felt that "[t]he state court's
reasoning would trivialize this due process limitation by holding it
satisfied if the income in question 'adds to the riches of the corporation.'

"154

Income from any source, the Court noted, is always a

"business advantage" to a corporation. 155 That the nondomiciliary
parent, Woolworth, derived some economic benefit from its ownership of stock was not enough. Consistent with its prior cases, the
Court concluded that the proper due process inquiry looks to "'the
underlying unity or diversity of business enterprise.' "1156
The Court in Woolworth nailed down the proposition that
even complete ownership by a parent of a subsidiary is not enough
to constitute a unitary enterprise. Woolworth, of course, had the
potential power to operate the subsidiaries as integrated divisions
of a single unitary business enterprise under Woolworth's "um157
brella of centralized management and controlled interaction.

Owning a controlling interest in each of the subsidiaries,
Woolworth could have elected all of the directors in three of the
subsidiaries and a majority in the other one. The Court noted that
in ASARCO it had declared that the potential to operate a company was not dispositive of the unitary business issue. Repeating
traditional doctrine, the Woolworth Court observed that for a corporation to avoid dividend apportionment, the dividend income
from its subsidiaries must be derived from "'unrelated business
activity'" that constitutes a "'discrete business enterprise.' ,58
The Court relied on Mobil in emphasizing that the right of a state
to tax dividends from foreign subsidiaries turns on whether the
(1981) (quoting Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 166 (1911)).

The Woolworth Court pointed out that the State supreme court had relied erroneously
on Flint, however, because the States are subject to limitations on their taxing powers that
do not apply to the federal government. 458 U.S. at 363.
154. 458 U.S. at 363 (quoting Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 70 (1920)).
155. 458 U.S. at 363.
156. Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 440).
157. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 224.
158. 458 U.S. at 362 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at
223-24 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439-42)).
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dividend income results from certain factors of profitability-" 'functional integration, centralization of management, and
economies of scale.' ,,115 Thus, the Woolworth Court established
these three "factors of profitability" as the polestar by which to
steer in deciding whether a unitary business exists.
In its analysis of Woolworth's relationship with the four dividend-paying subsidiaries, the Court decided the "unitariness" issue by reference to actual record evidence bearing on the existence
of the Mobil benchmarks of "functional integration, centralization
of management, and economies of scale."'6 0 The Court first found
little functional integration between Woolworth and its foreign
subsidiaries. 161 Woolworth and its subsidiaries "engaged exclusively in the business of retailing," 16-2 and the Court drew a sharp
distinction between the retailing business and the "highly integrated business" of locating, processing, and marketing petroleum-one which the Court found to constitute a unitary business
1 3
in Exxon."
In the Woolworth Court's opinion, the "evidence in
[Woolworth] is that no phase of any subsidiary's business was integrated with the parent's.' 1 64 To underpin this conclusion, the
Court made a laundry list of business characteristics to show that
no such integration existed. The Court was satisfied from the undisputed testimony that the subsidiaries were autonomous and independent of Woolworth in selection of store sites and in control
over advertising; furthermore, each subsidiary had its own accounting department, financial staff, and legal counsel.'6 5 No doubt
significant to the Court, Woolworth engaged in "no centralized
1 6
purchasing, manufacturing, or warehousing of merchandise.' 1
Seemingly, no intercompany sales of inventory took place. 6 7 Apparently of major importance to the Court, "each subsidiary was
responsible for obtaining its own financing from sources other than
[Woolworth].""" After weighing all of the relevant business char159. 458 U.S. at 364 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438). "If such 'factors of profitablity'
arising 'from the operation of the business as a whole' exist and evidence the operation of a
unitary business," the Court continued, then "a State can gain a justification for its tax
consideration of value that has no other connection with that State." Id.
160. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 438.
161. 458 U.S. at 364.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 365 (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at 365.
166. Id. (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 365 & n.13.
168. Id. at 366 (footnote omitted). This factor later proved significant in Container.
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acteristics, the Court concluded that the "record is persusasive
that Woolworth's operations were not functionally integrated with
its subsidiaries.'
Having concluded that the taxing State failed the litmus test
of "functional integration," the Court directed its attention to the
other two Mobil unitary business "factors of profitability"-"centralization of management" and "economies of scale." 17 0
The Court listed a number of characteristics that it thought
showed the absence of "centralization of management" and other
"economies of scale." Woolworth had no department devoted to
overseeing the foreign subsidiaries' operations. With one exception,
Woolworth and the subsidiaries had separate officers; Woolworth
did not rotate or train personnel to operate the subsidiaries;
Woolworth maintained no central merchandising training; the subsidiaries developed their own managers; each subsidiary possessed
autonomy to determine its own retailing policies, based on local
needs; and Woolworth did not review the tax returns of its subsidiaries.1 71 Particularly significant was the absence of a centralized
purchasing office, whose purpose would have been to "'increase
overall corporate profits through bulk purchases and efficient allo72
cation of supplies among'" the subsidiaries."
On the other hand, some aspects of Woolworth's operations
were earmarks of unitariness. The upper echelons of management
of Woolworth and its subsidiaries frequently communicated by
mail, telephone, and teletype. Woolworth and some of the subsidiaries had a number of common directors. Decisions about major
financial issues-for example, the amount of dividends to be paid
by the subsidiaries and the creation of substantial debt-required
approval by Woolworth, the parent. Additionally, Woolworth and
its subsidiaries prepared and published consolidated financial
statements. 7 3 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist, dissented' 4 relying on these indicators of a unitary operation. The Woolworth majority, however, thought that these
loans made by the taxpayer-parent (Container) to its subsidiaries, and guarantees of loans
made by local lenders to the subsidiaries, suggested to the Court a flow of value between
subsidiary and parent that indicated unitariness. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2944. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
169. 458 U.S. at 366.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 367-68.
172. Id. at 370 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 224).
173. Id. at 369.
174. Id. at 373 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
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functions were part of the normal oversight activities that any parent gives to an investment in a subsidiary. 17 5 To the Court, "the
parent company's operations are not interrelated with those of its
subsidiaries so that one's 'stable' operation is important to the
other's 'full utilization' of capacity.' 7 6 Moreover, the Woolworth
Court found a "notable absence of any 'umbrella of centralized
management and controlled interaction'" among the parent
(Woolworth) and the four foreign subsidiaries.17 7 After weighing all
the factors pertaining to unitariness, the Court concluded "on the
basis of undisputed facts, that the four subsidiaries in question are
not part of a unitary business under the principles articulated in
Mobil and Exxon, and today reiterated in ASARCO."' 7 8

IV. THE Container DECISION
7 9 the
In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,1
Supreme Court of the United States sustained the constitutionality of California's application of the unitary business principle to
the worldwide income of a United States based parent corporation
and its foreign subsidiaries. The Court decided that a state may
require an American parent corporation doing business in that
state to combine all its own income with the income that its sub-

175.

458 U.S. at 369. For a succinct analysis of ASARCO and Woolworth, setting forth

the business factors that the Court used to resolve the unitary business issue, see Seago,
supra note 145, at 112.

In two earlier cases in which the Court did find a unitary operation, it relied heavily on
the economies resulting from a central buying division. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 224 (discussed supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text); Butler
Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. at 508 ("[T]he operation of the central buying division alone

demonstrates that functionally the various branches are closely integrated.") (discussed
supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text).

176. 458 U.S. at 370 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at
218).
177. 458 U.S. at 372 (quoting Exxon, 447 U.S. at 224).
178. Id. at 369. For scholarly comments on ASARCO and Woolworth by an authority
who writes quite extensively in the area of state and local taxation, see J. HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 19, 1 8.11[4][a]-[h].
Some commentators have argued that ASARCO and Woolworth do not dictate that the
unitary business principle should be the exclusive test for state taxation of all dividends
that a taxed corporation receives, especially when the circumstances do not fit the ASARCO
and Woolworth unitary business principle mold. For the author's views, see P. HARTMAN,
supra note 19, § 9:30 (Supp. 1983). For additional comments, see J. HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 19, 9.12[2]; Floyd, supra note 145, at 505; Hellerstein, Reflections on ASARCO and
Woolworth, supra note 145, at 179; Pomp & Rudnick, Federal Tax Concepts as a Guide for
State Apportionment of Dividends: Life After ASARCO, 17 TAx NoTEs 411 (1982).
179. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983). The author also has discussed Containerin P. HARTMAN,
supra note 19, § 9:31 (Supp. 1984).
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sidiaries operating in foreign countries generate, and then to apportion a certain percentage of that combined amount for state income tax purposes.
The taxpayer in Container,a Delaware corporation headquartered in Illinois and doing business in California and elsewhere,
manufactured and distributed custom-ordered paperboard and paperboard-based packaging in the United States. Taxpayer conducted a vertically integrated operation, which included the production of paperboard from raw timber and wastepaper and its
composition into finished products.1 8 0 Although its operation was
largely domestic, during the tax years in question taxpayer owned
controlling interests in twenty foreign corporations organized and
located in four Latin American countries and four European countries. Taxpayer's percentage of ownership of these foreign corporations ranged between 66.7% and 100%.181 By and large, these foreign subsidiaries engaged in essentially the same line of business as
the taxpayer-parent, although none of the subsidiaries conducted
any business in the taxing State."8 2
Like a number of other states, California employed the unitary
business principle and formula apportionment method of taxing
corporations doing business both inside and outside the State. 8 "
The taxing State's apportionment formula was the common threefactor Massachusetts formula, based in equal parts on the proportion of a unitary business' total payroll, property, and sales located
in the taxing state."" Over taxpayer's objections the taxing State
treated the overseas subsidiaries as part of taxpayer's unitary business and required taxpayer to file a worldwide combined report of
its own income and the incomes of all its subsidiaries. 8 5 The California State courts sustained the tax.
In its appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
objecting taxpayer (Container) claimed that the application of the
State taxing scheme violated both the due process and the commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. The Court, however, upheld the tax as applied. In disposing of the Containercon180.

103 S. Ct. at 2943.

181. Id. Container formed many of its own subsidiaries, but also acquired a few companies. Brief for Appellee at 7, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933
(1983).
182.
183.

103 S. Ct. at 2943.
CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 25104, 25105 (West 1979) (noted in 103 S. Ct. at 2942

& n.5).
184.
185.

See supra note 25.
103 S. Ct. at 2945.
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troversy, the Court resolved the following principal issues, which
this Article will examine seriatim:
A. Did Container Corporation and its foreign subsidiaries constitute a "unitary business" for purposes of state taxation, as required by the due process
clause?
B. Did the taxing State's worldwide unitary method, through distortion of
income attributable to the State by the formula, impose a tax on income
earned outside the State, in violation of the due process and commerce
clauses?
C. Did the taxing State's worldwide unitary method produce duplicative taxation of income or impair16the foreign policy of the United States, in violation
of the commerce clause? "

A.

Unitary Business

The Container Court first addressed the issue of whether taxpayer and its foreign subsidiaries constituted a unitary business
1
operation for tax purposes, as the due process clause requires. 17
Since the existence of a unitary operation is "the linchpin of apportionability, 18 8 as a matter of due process a state, through the
application of its apportionment formula, must not reach its tax
talons beyond the boundaries of the "unitary business" enterprise.
The Court has established clearly that when "the business activities of the [foreign subsidiaries and affiliates producing the dividend income] have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient [of that income] in the taxing State, due process considerations
might well preclude apportionability, because there would be no
underlying unitary business."1 19
In addressing the unitary business issue, the Court began by
noting that "the taxpayer always has the 'distinct burden of showing by "clear and cogent evidence" that [the state tax] results in
extraterritorial values being taxed.' "190 Ostensibly to reduce future
challenges to state income tax systems by multijurisdictional cor186. See id. at 2939.
187. Id. at 2945-48.

188. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 439. As mentioned
above, the Court subsequently quoted this language in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of

Revenue, 447 U.S. at 223; ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 458 U.S. at 317; and
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. at 362.
189. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 442. The absence of a
"unitary business" actually precluded apportionment in F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation
and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982), and in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,
458 U.S. at 307. See supra notes 96-178 and accompanying text.

190. 103 S.Ct. at 2945 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S.
at 221 (quoting Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. at 507 (quoting Norfolk &W. Ry. Co. v.
North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1936)))).
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porations, in Containerthe Court for the first time announced that
it would defer to state court determinations about the existence of
' The Court
a unitary enterprise whenever "reasonably possible."191
assigned itself a two-fold task: "to determine whether the state
court applied the correct standards to the case; and if it did,
whether its judgment 'was within the realm of permissible
judgment.' "192
After examining a number of findings by the California State
court, the ContainerCourt deemed the State court's decision that
Container and its subsidiaries composed a unitary operation
"within the realm of permissible judgment."1 93 The Court first considered taxpayer's contention that the State court had employed
an improper legal standard in reaching its conclusion. Taxpayer argued that the State court had treated the taxpayer's "potential" to
control the operation of its subsidiaries as a dispositive factor in
finding that a unitary business existed.1 94 In Woolworth,"s5 taxpayer argued, the Court had declared that taxpayer's potential
power to control its subsidiaries was insufficient to warrant the
finding of a unitary business; under Woolworth the control must
be actual. The Container Court was not convinced by taxpayer's
argument, however, and concluded that the State court properly
relied on its finding that high officials of Container "'gave directions to subsidiaries for compliance with the parent's standard of
professionalism, profitability, and ethical practices.' "I"
Next, the Court dismissed Container's argument that the
State court had committed error in endorsing a State administra191. "It will do the cause of legal certainty little good if this Court turns every colorable claim that a state court erred in a particular application of those principles into a de
novo adjudication, whose unintended nuances would then spawn further litigation and an
avalanche of critical comment." 103 S. Ct. at 2946 (footnote omitted).
192. Id. at 2946 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
193. Id. at 2948. This deference to state court findings on the unitary business issue
marks a shift in the Court's approach. In ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458
U.S. at 307, the Court, relying on factual findings made by the State court, reversed the
State court's conclusion that a unitary business operation existed. Also, in F.W. Woolworth
Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. at 354, the Court examined the evidence and
reversed the State court's unitary business finding after concluding that the State court
applied an improper legal standard in reaching its decision. See supra notes 109-78 and
accompanying text.
194. 103 S. Ct. at 2947.
195. See supra notes 146-78 and accompanying text.
196. 103 S. Ct. at 2946 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal.
App. 3d 988, 998, 173 Cal. Reptr. 121, 127-28 (1981)). The Court explained that although
potential control was not "dispositive" of the unitary business issue, it was, nonetheless,
"relevant" to that question. 103 S.Ct. at 2946 n.16.
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tive presumption that corporations engaged in the same line of
business are unitary. 197 While agreeing that the presumption did
enter into the State court's reasoning, the Court was of the opinion
that the presumption was only one element among many that the
State court had considered. Moreover, the Court proceeded to explain that the presumption was reasonable.
When a corporation invests in a subsidiary that engages in the same line of
work as itself, it becomes much more likely that one function of the investment is to make better use-either through economies of scale or through
operational integration1 or sharing of expertise-of the parent's existing business-related resources. 9

In wrapping up its analysis of whether the State courts had
applied a proper standard, the Court examined Container's proposal that the Court adopt a "bright-line" rule requiring "a substantial flow of goods" between the corporations as a prerequisite to
finding that a mercantile or manufacturing enterprise is unitary. 199
The adoption of a "substantial flow of goods" test would add
much-needed certainty to this area, argued Container, and purportedly would reflect the reason for the development of formulary
apportionment. 0 0 The Court, however, declined to adopt this test,
specifically noting that "[t]he prerequisite to a constitutionally acceptable finding of unitary business is a flow of value, not a flow of
goods. ' 20 1 The Court conceded that a prerequisite "flow of goods"
test, as a policy matter, may be sensible, and that authority for
such a requirement-despite the opposition of some commentators-does exist, but the Court saw no reason to impose a "substantial flow of goods" test on all the states as a requirement of
constitutional law.202 Instead, the Court repeated what it had said
on a number of occasions: "a relevant question in the unitary busi197. 103 S. Ct. at 2947.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Brief for Appellant at 47, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct.
2933.
201. 103 S.Ct. at 2947. Expressing what it regarded as the importance of the "flow of
value," the Court said:
In addition, the principles we have quoted require that the out-of-State activities of
the purported "'unitary business'" be related in some concrete way to the in-State
activities. The functional meaning of this requirement is that there be some sharing or
exchange of value not capable of precise identification or measurement-beyond the
mere flow of funds arising out of a passive investment or a distinct business operation-which renders formula apportionment a reasonable method of taxation.
103 S.Ct. at 2940.
202. Id. at 2947 n.17.
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ness inquiry is whether 'contributions to income [of the subsidiaries] result[ed] from functional integration, centralization of man-

agement, and economies of scale.'

''203

"'[S]ubstantial

mutual

interdependence'... can arise in any number of ways," said the
Court; "a substantial flow of goods is clearly one but just as clearly
'20 4
not the only one.
The Container opinion analyzes in considerable detail the aspects of the business relationship between taxpayer and its subsidiaries that throw light on the existence of a unitary business.
' 20 5
Container claimed that it had a "relatively hands-off attitude
in the management of its subsidiaries, and that there was a
minimal flow of goods between taxpayer and its subsidiaries, with
sales of materials from the parent to the subsidiaries accounting
for only about one percent of the total purchases of the subsidiaries. 2 08 Taxpayer also stressed that the subsidiaries were relatively
autonomous in matters of personnel and day-to-day
management.2 0 7
The Court, however, found other aspects of the parent-subsidiary relationship which led it to conclude that Container and its
foreign subsidiaries did constitute a unitary operation for tax purposes. During each of the tax years at issue, taxpayer had made
sales, averaging over one million dollars per year, of raw material
to most of the subsidiaries. 208 Also, during this period taxpayer had
assigned a senior vice president and four other officers to oversee
the operations of the subsidiaries. 20 9 The Court found that "these
officers established general standards of professionalism, profitability, and ethical practices and dealt with major problems and longterm decisions," even though "day-to-day management of the subsidiaries . . . was left in the hands of local executives who were
always citizens of the host country."2 10 Additionally, Container
"had a number of its directors and officers on the boards of directors of the subsidiaries, but they did not generally play an active
203. Id. at 2947 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458
U.S. at 364 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 438)).
204. Id. at 2947 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458
U.S. at 371).
205. Id. at 2944 n.8.
206. Id. at 2943.
207. Id. at 2944.
208. Brief for Appellee, supra note 181, at 23.
209. 103 S. Ct. at 2944.
210. Id.
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role in management decisions. '211
Notwithstanding the measure of autonomy the subsidiaries
enjoyed, the Court opined that "in certain respects, the relationship between [taxpayer] and its subsidiaries was decidedly
close. '2 12 Taxpayer provided substantial financing to the subsidiaries through direct loans and guarantees of loans made by local
lenders. The loans that taxpayer made or guaranteed amounted to
approximately half of the subsidiaries' financing. " ' Container also
provided the subsidiaries with substantial technical assistance.
Taxpayer gave advice and furnished technical services-"knowhow"-regarding manufacturing techniques, engineering, design,
architecture, insurance, and cost accounting to a number of its
subsidiaries. 1 4 Additionally, taxpayer assisted its subsidiaries in
procuring equipment, 2 15 either by arranging for the purchase of
new equipment2 16 or from time to time by selling used equipment
to the subsidiaries. 1 7 Further, the Court agreed with the State
court's finding of "'considerable interplay between [Container]
and its foreign subsidiaries in the area of corporate expansion.' ",218
The Court concluded that it "need not decide whether any one of
these factors would be sufficient as a constitutional matter to prove
the existence of a unitary business. Taken in combination, at least,
they clearly demonstrate that the State court reached a conclusion
"'within the realm of permissible judgment.' ,219
The Court emphasized as deserving particular mention two of
the factors on which the State court relied in deciding the unitary
issue. First, the Court stressed "the flow of capital resources from
appellant to its subsidiaries through loans and loan guarantees."220
The Court pointedly noted that there "is no indication that any of
these capital transactions were conducted at arm's-length, and the
resulting flow of value is obvious. '221 The Court observed that
"capital transactions can serve either an investment function or an
211. Id. (footnote omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. The subsidiaries' new equipment purchases totalled $5 million to $7 million each
year. Brief for Appellee, supra note 181, at 26.
217. 103 S. Ct. at 2944.
218. Id. at 2947 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. App.
3d 988, 997, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121, 127 (1981)).
219. Id. at 2948 (footnote omitted).
220. Id. at 2948 n.19.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
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operational function"; transactions falling in the latter category
generally indicate unitary operations. The Court pointed out that
the purpose of Container's capital transactions with its subsidiaries
clearly was to increase the growth and profitability of Container's
overseas operations, rather than just to generate investment income. 222 The second factor that the Court regarded as noteworthy
in establishing a unitary operation between taxpayer and its subsidiaries was "the managerial role played by appellant in its subsidiaries' affairs. ' 223 The Court pointed out that it had made clear
in Woolworth that a unitary business finding could not be predicated merely on "the type of occasional oversight-with respect to
capital structure, major debt, and dividends-that any parent
gives to an investment in a subsidiary. '224 On the other hand, the
Court recalled its holding in Exxon 22 5 that "mere decentralization
of day-to-day management responsibility and accountability cannot defeat a unitary business finding." 226 According to the
Container majority, "the difference lies in whether the management role that the parent does play is grounded in its own operational expertise and its overall operational strategy. ' 227 To demonstrate that Container's management role suggested a unitary
business, the Court concluded this aspect of the opinion by noting
that the "business 'guidelines' established by [Container] for its
subsidiaries, the 'consensus' process by which [Container's] management was involved in the subsidiaries' business decisions, and
the sometimes uncompensated technical assistance provided by
[Container], all point to precisely the sort of operational role [that
the Court] found lacking in F.W. Woolworth."2 ' In short, the
Container Court relied on traditional judicial thinking in deciding
whether a unitary business existed, by asking whether there were
contributions to the income of the subsidiaries and affiliates resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and
economies of scale.2 29 Specifically, the Court, however, also noted
that "the prerequisite to a constitutionally acceptable finding of a
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2948 n.19.
224. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. at 369.
225. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 224-25.
226. 103 S. Ct. at 2948 n.19.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 2947; F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. at
364; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 438.
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unitary business is a flow of value, not a flow of goods."230 As the
Container opinion indicates, the elastic concept of "flow of value"
includes much more than the "flow of goods."
B.

Fairnessof the Apportionment Formula

Having determined that Container and its foreign subsidiaries
constituted a unitary business, the Court turned to the question of
whether the application of the three-factor apportionment formula
was fair 3 1 as both the due process and commerce clauses require.3 2 The taxing State had combined all the worldwide income
of Container and its foreign subsidiaries for apportionment and
had included the property, payroll, and sales of Container and its
foreign subsidiaries in its calculation of the percentage to be attributed to the taxing State. To unhinge the tax on the grounds of
unfairness of apportionment, the complaining taxpayer in
Containerhad the burden of proving that there was "'no rational
relationship between the income attributed to the [taxing] State
and the intrastate values of the enterprise,' "1233 by showing that
the income attributed to the taxing State was "'out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted in that State.' ,2-,
In attacking the fairness of the apportionment in Container,
taxpayer insisted that California's application of its three-factor
apportionment formula to the worldwide income of Container and
its foreign subsidiaries resulted in extraterritorial taxation of in23 5
come by the taxing State in violation of the due process clause.
Taxpayer reasoned that the fairness of the three-factor formula depends on the premise that a dollar of payroll or property expended
or used in one state, and a dollar of sales realized in that same
state, normally should produce roughly the same amount of income
as a dollar spent or realized in sales in other states. 23 6 That premise, taxpayer argued, is not true when the three-factor formula is
applied to income generated in foreign countries. Hence, California's attempted extension of the three-factor formula beyond the
230.

103 S. Ct. at 2947 (footnote omitted).

231. 103 S. Ct. at 2948.
232. Id. at 2942.
233. Id. at 2948 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 220
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 437)).
234. 103 S. Ct. at 2948 (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. at 135).
235. Brief for Appellant, supra note 200, at 11.
236. Id. at 19.
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borders of the United States produced a distorted and unfair result by attributing too great a share of the combined income of
Container and its foreign subsidiaries to the taxing State.3 7 Taxpayer attempted to demonstrate this distortion by presenting statistical evidence and expert testimony, based on separate accounting,2 8 showing that Container's main foreign subsidiaries produced
a larger amount of income per dollar of property, payroll, and sales
than did Container's operations in the United States.23 9 Because

these overseas subsidiaries were more profitable than Container itself, taxpayer argued that the apportionment formula unfairly
2 40
shifted this foreign source income to California for tax purposes.
Taxpayer also insisted that some of its foreign subsidiaries operated in developing countries where the costs of production were
significantly lower than in the United States, primarily because of
lower wage rates.241 Moreover, Container argued, those lower wage
rates were not offset by lower production.242 Since wages were one
of the three factors used in the apportionment formula, concluded
taxpayer, the use of the formula unfairly inflated the amount of
income attributed to the taxing State, where wages were high.243 In
short, because the worldwide combined apportionment by the taxing State failed to account for the lower wage rates and greater
profitability of the operations of the foreign subsidiaries, taxpayer
insisted that this apportionment method resulted in extraterrito24
rial taxation of income actually earned in foreign countries. '
The Container Court rejected this due process distortion argument. Addressing taxpayer's position that formula apportionment
systematically distorted the true allocation of income between taxpayer and the subsidiaries, the Court responded that the profit
237. Id.
238. For an explanation of the separate accounting method of attributing income, see
supra note 26.
239. Brief for Appellant, supra note 200, at 14, 18. In addition, taxpayer asserted that
a comparison of the amount of income taxed by California with the sum taxed by the federal government further illustrated this distortion. Formula apportionment as applied to the
worldwide income of Container and affiliates, urged taxpayer, attributed significantly more
income to the domestic operations of Container for tax purposes than did the sophisticated
accounting techniques that the Internal Revenue Service uses to compute income for federal
income tax purposes. Id. at 16-17.
240. Official Transcript of Oral Arguments at 14, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983); Brief for Appellant, supra note 200, at 19.
241. Brief for Appellant, supra note 200, at 12-14.
242. Id. at 13.
243. Id. at 14.
244. Id. at 15.
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figures that taxpayer relied on were based on the separate accounting method, "whose basic theoretical weaknesses justify resort to
formula apportionment in the first place." 4" The Court noted that
it had rejected a similar argument in Mobil, pointing out that
whenever a unitary business exists,
"separate [geographical] accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of
income received in various States, may fail to account for contributions to
income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management,
and economies of scale. Because these factors of profitability arise from the
operation of the business as a whole, it becomes misleading to characterize
the income of the business as having a single indentifiable 'source.' Although
separate geographical accounting may be useful for internal auditing, for pur' 24 6
poses of state taxation it is not constitutionally required.

The Court also rejected Container's argument that, since the
wage rates were lower in the foreign countries where its subsidiaries operated than in the United States, the use of the formula unfairly inflated the amount of income apportioned to taxpayer's
United States operation. The Court answered taxpayer's
arguments:
The problem with all this evidence, however, is that it does not by itself
come close to impeaching the basic rationale behind the three-factor formula.
[Container] and its foreign subsidiaries have been determined to be a unitary
business. It therefore may well be that in addition to the foreign payroll going
into the production of any given corrugated container by a foreign subsidiary,
there is also California payroll, as well as other California factors, contributing-albeit more indirectly-to the same production. The mere fact that this
possibility is not reflected in [Container's] accounting does24 7 not disturb the
underlying premise of the formula apportionment method.

Earlier, in the context of a different apportionment formula,
the Court had addressed a similar challenge to the fairness of one
of the factors in the formula. The Court pointed out that in the
apportionment of the income of a unitary business operation, the
formula employed must give adequate weight to the essential elements responsible for the earning of the income; the Court, however, noted that the propriety of the formula does not require that
the factors employed be as productive in the taxing jurisdiction as
they are for the business as a whole:
The implications of the formula being what they are, a taxpayer does not
escape the application of the statute by evidence directed to only one of the
related terms. Its evidence to be effective must be directed to each of them
alike, for only thus can the assumed relation between them be proved to be
245. 103 S. Ct. at 2948.
246. Id. at 2948-49 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438) (citation omitted).
247. Id. at 2949.
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unreal.2 18

Likewise, the Container Court noted that both "geographical
accounting and formula apportionment are imperfect proxies for
an ideal which is not only difficult to achieve in practice, but also
difficult to describe in theory."24 9 The three-factor formula had
gained wide approval, explained the Court, because it works to
avoid the type of distortions in income attribution that were present in Hans Rees'.25 0 The three factors-property, payroll, and
sales- "appear in combination to reflect a very large share of the
'2 51
activities by which value is generated.

The ContainerCourt recognized that even the three-factor apportionment formula is necessarily imperfect. Giving one-third
weight to each of the three elements in the formula is essentially
arbitrary, thought the Court. Moreover, payroll, property, and
sales arguably do not exhaust the entire set of factors relevant to
the production of income. In addition, the correlation between
each of the formula factors and income is by no means clear or
exact. 252 Still, the Court said it had seen no evidence demonstrat-

ing that the margin of error inherent in the three-factor formula is
greater than the margin of error in the kind of separate accounting
that taxpayer urged upon the Court in seeking to upset the apportionment as constitutionally unfair. 25 31 Even according to taxpayer's

own statistics purporting to show the "enormous distortions" produced by the taxing State's apportionment method, the three-factor formula attributed a mere fourteen percent more income to the
taxing State than did Container's separate accounting method."'
That fourteen percent distortion, thought the Court, was a "far cry
from the more than 250% difference which led us to strike down
the state tax in Hans Rees'. '255 In any event, concluded the Court,
the distortion figure in Container was "a figure certainly within
the substantial margin of error inherent in any method of attribut248.
added).

Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1936) (emphasis

249.

103 S. Ct. at 2949.

250.

Id. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.

251.

103 S. Ct. at 2949.

252.

Id. at 2949 & n.20.

253.

Id. at 2950.

254.

Id.

255.

Id.
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ing fincome among the components of a unitary business. '26
C. Japan Line and the Foreign Commerce Clause Issues
After approving California's application of the unitary business principle and the three-factor apportionment formula to
Container's worldwide income, the Court turned to two related-and perhaps the most significant-issues that remained: (1)
did the California worldwide unitary method produce duplicative
taxation of income in violation of the commerce clause; and (2) did
the California worldwide unitary method impair the foreign policy
of the United States in violation of the commerce clause?
To decide these commerce clause issues, the Container Court
resorted to the guidelines that it had enunicated four years earlier
in JapanLine, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.25 7 In Japan Line
the Court struck down a local property tax imposed on foreign
commerce. The issue in that case, as the Court formulated it, was
"whether instrumentalities of commerce that are owned, based,
and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem
property taxation by a State."2'58 In addition to considering the
four-fold Complete Auto Transit2 59 precepts for valid taxation of
interstate commerce,2 60 the Japan Line Court erected two other
constitutional hurdles that a taxing state must clear for valid taxation when foreign commerce is concerned. The two additional considerations are: (1) whether the tax, notwithstanding its apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international tax
multiplication; 26 1 and (2) whether the tax prevents the federal government from "'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.' ,1262 In Japan Line the
Court held that the tax contravened both of these commerce clause
considerations and, thus, was invalid. Finding forbidden duplicative taxation, the Court observed that no authority in the United
256. Id. (citations omitted).
257. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
258. Id. at 444.
259. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
260. Under the four-pronged test of Complete Auto Transit, a tax may be applied
only to activities that have a substantial nexus with the taxing state; the tax must be fairly
apportioned; it must not discriminate against interstate commerce; and it must be fairly
related to the services provided by the state. 430 U.S. at 279. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
261. 441 U.S. at 451.
262. Id.
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States can ensure fair apportionment when one of the taxing bodies is a foreign sovereign.2 63 The Court frankly recognized that it
"is powerless to correct malapportionment of taxes imposed from
abroad in foreign commerce. "264 The Japan Line Court also concluded that the tax did prevent the federal government from
"speaking with one voice" in regulating foreign trade 26 5 and, therefore, "impair[ed] federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential." 266
'Applying the two Japan Line requirements to the facts of
Container, the Court rejected taxpayer's argument that California's worldwide combined method of reporting violated one or both
of the Japan Line precepts. In the most controversial aspect of
Container,e7 a majority of Justices voted to uphold the tax against
the contention that the Japan Line doctrines relegated the tax to
the dustbin of commerce clause oblivion. The Container Court recognized that California's taxing system produced actual double
taxation:26s the foreign subsidiaries' income was subject both to
unapportioned taxation in full by foreign nations, and to apportioned taxation in California as part of Container's unitary business. 26 9 In JapanLine the Court also had found actual double taxation; Japan already had taxed the vehicles of commerce that
California was attempting to tax.270 Nevertheless, the Container
majority did not regard the existence of duplicative taxation as a
valid objection to the California tax under the Japan Line doctrines. While agreeing that Containerwas similar to JapanLine in
a number of important respects, 271 the Court still concluded that
the Containertax was distinguishable from the tax in Japan Line
in crucial ways.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

447.
454.
452-54.
448.

267. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, vigorously
dissented from the Court's decision upholding the Container tax on the grounds that the
California tax violated both of the JapanLine precepts. See 103 S. Ct. at 2957 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
268. 103 S. Ct. at 2951-52.
269. Id. at 2951.
270. 441 U.S. at 451-52.
271. 103 S. Ct. at 2951-52. The Court mentioned four similarities between the

Container and JapanLine facts: (1) actual double taxation that (2) stemmed from the divergency in the taxing schemes of California and the foreign taxing authorities; (3) conformity of the foreign taxing method with accepted international practice; and (4) the federal
government's preference for the internationally accepted method. Id.
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At the outset, the Court noted the narrowness of the question
presented in JapanLine: "'whether instrumentalities of commerce
that are owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used
exclusively in international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem property taxation by a State.' -1272 The Court
then proceeded to distinguish JapanLine on a number of grounds.
First, the Court noted that the tax in Japan Line was a property
tax; the Containertax was a tax on income. The Court pointed out
that it had distinguished property taxation from income taxation
in Mobil,273 when it suggested that the "reasons for allocation to a
single situs that often apply in the case of property taxation carry
little force" in the case of income taxation. 27 As a second ground

for distinction from Japan Line, the Court declared that the
Containerdouble taxation, although real, was not the "inevitable"
result of the California taxing scheme. According to the Court, the
double taxation in Container stemmed from a serious divergence
between the taxing systems adopted by California and by the governments of the foreign countries in which Container's subsidiaries
operated. 275 Each of the relevant foreign jurisdictions, as well as

the federal government, had adopted what the Court designated as
a "qualified separate accounting approach-often referred to as
the 'arm's-length' approach-to the taxation of related corporations.

'278

Describing the "arm's-length" approach, the Court ex-

plained that
every corporation, even if closely tied to other corporations, is treated for
most-but decidedly not all-purposes as if it were an independent entity
dealing at arm's length with its affiliated corporations, and subject to taxation
in which it operates and only for the income it realonly by the jurisdictions
277
izes on its own books.

The Court compared the operation of the "arm's-length" approach
and formula apportionment method and concluded that whether
multiple taxation results from either method may vary from case

to case. 278 The only sure way of avoiding double taxation, re272. 103 S. Ct. at 2952 n.24 (quoting JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 444).
273. 445 U.S. at 444-45. See supra notes 42-76 and accompanying text.
274. 445 U.S. at 445.
275. 103 S. Ct at 2952.
276. Id. at 2950 (footnote omitted).
277. Id. at 2950.
278. Here, by contrast, we are faced with two distinct methods of allocating the
income of a multi-national enterprise. The "arm's-length" approach divides the pie on
the basis of formal accounting principles. The formula apportionment method divides
the same pie on the basis of a mathematical generalization. Whether the combination
of the two methods results in the same income being taxed twice or in some portion of
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marked the Court, would be to deny to the states the power to tax
such foreign source dividend income of the subsidiaries at all.279
No party in Containerhad suggested such a rule, and in the view
of the Court, its obvious unfairness required no elaboration. 80
The third difference between Container and Japan Line, as
the ContainerCourt saw it, was that the incidence of the "tax here
falls, not on the foreign owners of an instrumentality of foreign
commerce, but on a corporation domiciled and headquartered in
the United States. 2 81 This third difference appeared very signifi-

cant to the Container Court. The Court's reasoning in upholding
the Container tax seems heavily dependent upon the identity of
the taxpayer; the tax fell neither on a parent corporation of a foreign country nor on a corporation of foreign ownership, but rather
fell on a corporation domiciled and headquartered in the United
States. By contrast, in Japan Line the State imposed the tax on
the property of a foreign-based (Japanese) corporation. Thus,
Container, leaves open the question of whether the unitary business principle and worldwide apportionment will be applicable to
foreign multinational corporations. 8 2 Shortly after Container the
Court was afforded two opportunities to decide the issue of
whether a state tax reaching income from a foreign parent can
clear the constitutional hurdles. Unfortunately, the Court refused
to hear either case. 8 3
income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on the facts of the individual case.
Id. at 2952 (footnote omitted). As an example of worldwide apportionment producing a result different from Container,the Court cited Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84 IMI.2d
102, 417 N.E.2d 1343 (1981), prob. juris. noted sub noma.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.
Caterpillar Tractor .Co., 102 S. Ct. 564 (1982), dismissed for lack of substantialfederal
question, 103 S. Ct. 3562 (1983). In that case, "application of worldwide combined apportionment resulted in a refund to the taxpayer from the amount he had paid under a tax
return that included neither foreign income nor foreign apportionment factors." Container,
103 S. Ct. at 2952 n.25. In fact, Caterpillar Tractor Co. filed an amicus curiae brief in the
Containercase supporting the Containertax.
279. 103 S.Ct. at 2953.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 2952. The Court "specifically left open in Japan Line the application of
that case to 'domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce.'" Id.
(quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 444).
282. "We have no need to address in this opinion the constitutionality of combined
apportionment with respect to state taxation of domestic corporations with foreign parents
or foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries." Id. at 2952 &
n.26; see also id. at 2955-56 & n.32.
283. See Shell Petroleum, N.V.v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Shell Petroleum, N.V.v. Franchetti, 104 S.Ct. 537 (1983); Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 558 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (facts contained in 539 F. Supp. 512
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)), aff'd without opinion, No. 83-7236 (2d Cir. June 17, 1983), cert denied,
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Although multiple taxation in the context of foreign commerce
deserves to receive close scrutiny, observed the Court, that scrutiny must take into account the circumstances in which the duplicative taxation occurs and the options reasonably available to the
taxing state. 28 4 Even if California were to adopt the "arm's-length"
method of attributing income, as taxpayer urged, double taxation
would not necessarily end, thought the Court.2 5 Differing administrative rules under which the various foreign countries reallocate
income among affiliated corporations make the elimination of the
possibility of double taxation impossible, observed the Court.2 8 Indeed, the Container Court felt that the use of the "arm's-length"
method by California might "end up subjecting those corporations
to more serious double taxation than would occur under formula
apportionment. '2 7 Since California's method of formula apportionment does not lead "inevitably" to double taxation, the Court
thought "it would be perverse, simply for the sake of avoiding
double taxation, to require California to give up one allocation
method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxation."28 8 In short, by clear implication the Court in Container
weakened its statement in Japan Line that "'[e]ven a slight overlapping of tax-a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a
domestic context-assumes importance when sensitive matters of
foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned.' ",289
The Container Court next turned to the second inquiry that
Japan Line suggested: a determination of whether the California
apportionment in the context of international taxation "'impair[ed] federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is
essential,' "290 and thus prevented the federal government from
"'speaking with one voice'" in regulating international trade.29 1
The Court began with the principle that "if a state tax merely has
foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign affairs, [the
Court] cannot infer, '[a]bsent some explicit directive from Congress, . . . that treatment of foreign income at the federal level
104 S. Ct. 705 (1984).
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

103 S. Ct. at 2953.
Id.
Id. at 2953-54.
Id. at 2954 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2954-55.
Id. at 2953 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 456) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2955 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448).
Id. (quoting JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 453).
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mandates identical treatment by the States.' "292 For a tax to be

barred by the "one voice" aspect of the commerce clause, the
Court observed, the tax either must implicate foreign policy issues
that are the domain of the federal government or must violate a
clear federal directive. 2 3 The Court thought the most obvious for-

eign policy implication of the questioned tax was the threat that it
might offend foreign trading partners and lead them to retaliate
against the nation as a whole. 294 Before addressing that potential

threat, however, the Court acknowledged that it has little competence in determining when foreign nations will be offended, and
"even less competence in deciding how to balance a particular risk
of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a
whole to let the States tax as they please. '295 This issue, in the
Court's thinking, more properly should be the concern of the executive and legislative branches.296
Against the background of those disclaimers, the Court saw
three factors that weighed heavily against the conclusion that the
tax might lead to foreign retaliation. First, in the Court's opinion,
the challenged tax did not create an "'automatic asymmetry'" in
international taxation. 297 In other words, double taxation would

not necessarily occur in every instance.29 8 Second, California imposed the tax on a United States based corporation, not on a foreign entity whose taxation might stir up retaliation. Last, taxpayer
was no doubt amenable to taxation by California in one way or
292.
293.
294.

Id. (quoting Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 448).
Id.
Id.

295. Id.
296. Id. at 2956.
297. Id. at 2955 (quoting JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 453).
298. California's taxation system seemingly has not been a heavy deterrent to investment in that State by foreign-based multinational corporations. A steady movement by multinational firms into the State has been occurring, although many of these firms, by locating

in California, may subject themselves to taxation based on formula apportionment of their
worldwide income. According to reports that the United States Census Bureau has published, California leads the nation in the number of foreign-based firms with two or more
establishments; furthermore, California has increased its lead over other states since the
Bureau began its series of reports in 1975. In 1980 California had 4,829 such foreign-owned
establishments, compared to 1,999 in 1975. California's 1980 total was 1,130 more than second place New York's. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN-OWNED U.S. FIRMS: 1980 Table 6 (1982); BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS,

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN-

U.S. FIRMS: 1975-1976 Table 7, at 15 (1979); see Brief of Citizens for Tax Justice, as
Amici Curiae in support of the California Franchise Tax Board at 22 & n.37, Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983).
OWNED
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another; the amount of the tax Container pays, thought the Court,
is much more a function of California's tax rate than of its method
of attributing income to California for tax purposes.29 9 Moreover,
although the Court was aware that the tax might have foreign policy implications other than the threat of foreign retaliation, the
Court viewed the Justice Department's failure to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the California tax as suggesting, when
combined with all other considerations, that the California taxing
system posed no serious threat to the foreign policy of the United
States.3 00
Finally, the Court considered whether the tax violated a clear
federal directive-that is, whether federal law had preempted the
tax. The Court found no preemption, either by congressional statute or by treaty.30 1 The Court heard no claim that federal tax statutes themselves provided a necessary preemptive force. The tax
treaties that the United States had entered into with foreign nations did not control taxes imposed by the contracting nations on
their own domestic corporations, and none of the treaties to which
the United States was a party concerned the taxing activities of
states.3 02 Moreover, the Court pointed out that at least once in
considering a proposed treaty, the Senate had rejected a provision
in the treaty that would have restricted the power of the states to
apportion worldwide income. 03 The Court reiterated its statement
in Mobil that "'Congress has long debated, but has not enacted,
299. 103 S. Ct. at 2955-56. Regardless of the merits of these three arguments, the
Court evidently underestimated the possibility of foreign retaliatory measures, or at least
the magnitude of foreign criticism of its decision. Japan, Canada, and the countries in the
European Economic Community all communicated to the Department of State their criticisms of the unitary method of taxation. See Brief of Shell Petroleum, N.V., app. at 54a-89a,
Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Franchetti, 104 S. Ct. 537 (1983) (collecting correspondence from
foreign diplomats concerning the unitary method of taxation), denying cert. to Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983).
300. 103 S. Ct. at 2956. The Solicitor General did submit to the Court a brief opposing
a state's worldwide formula apportionment contested in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos,
84 Ill. 2d 102, 417 N.E.2d 1343 (1981), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 102 S. Ct. 564 (1982), dismissed for lack of substantialfederal question, 103 S.Ct. 3562 (1983). See 103 S. Ct. at 2956 n.33. President Reagan ordered
the Justice Department not to file an amicus brief supporting a petition for rehearing of
Containerand instead recommended an alternative approach. President Reagan proposed a
high-level task force to develop a compromise settlement of the long-standing disputes
among states, multinationals, and U.S. trading partners. Unitary Taxes: Supreme Court Declines to Rehear Case Upholding California'sCorporate Unitary Tax, DAILY REPORT FOR
EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 197, at G-1 (Oct. 11, 1983).
301. 103 S. Ct. at 2956-57.
302. Id. at 2956.
303. Id; [2 Tax Treaties] FED. TAXEs 1 89,001, at p. 89,003, 89,003, at pp. 89,006-07.
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legislation designed to regulate state taxation of income,' "'0 including legislation governing worldwide apportionment. Thus, the
Container Court concluded that the California tax at issue was
neither preempted by federal law nor fatally inconsistent with fed30 5
eral policy.
D.

The Container Dissent

Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor joined,3 0 6 vigorously dissented. The dissent did not consider whether taxpayer and its subsidiaries constituted a unitary
operation; nor did it consider the fairness of the apportionment
formula. The dissent focused entirely on whether the Container
tax violated the commerce clause.30 7 To the dissent, the tax in issue violated both precepts of Japan Line-that is, the tax inevitably led to double taxation, and seriously implicated foreign policy
issues that must be left to the federal government.308 The distinctions that the majority drew between Japan Line and Container
were not acceptable to the dissenting Justices. As the dissent saw
Line tax also
it, the principles used to strike down the Japan
309
should have been fatal to the tax in Container.
Addressing the first facet of the JapanLine doctrine, the dissent took the position that the Court's reasoning in Containerhad
serious weaknesses regarding duplicative taxation of Container's
foreign source income. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion notes
that the Court conceded that international double taxation is particularly disfavored; the dissent further pointed to the Court's concession that double taxation did exist in Container because California had adopted a taxing system (worldwide formula
apportionment) that significantly departed from the internationally accepted arm's-length method, which the foreign countries
where the subsidiaries operated had adopted and which the United
States government favored.3 10 Moreover, the Court agreed with
Justice Powell's dissent that the Containertax on foreign source
income deserved close scrutiny.3 11
304.

103 S. Ct. at 2956 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 448).

305. Id. at 2957.
306. Id. at 2957-61.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2957 (Powell, J., dissenting).
(Powell, J., dissenting).
(Powell, J., dissenting).
(Powell, J., dissenting).
at 2957 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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While the majority agreed that double taxation actually existed in Container and, thus, warranted close scrutiny, the Court
nevertheless upheld the tax on the ground that, because of differing administrative rules and accounting practices of various countries, California would not necessarily reduce double taxation by
adopting the arm's-length separate accounting method.31 2 To the
dissent, this argument by the Court failed to recognize the fundamental difference between the actual double taxation that existed
in Container and the risk of double taxation that remains under
an arm's-length system.$13
In his disagreement with the Court, Justice Powell emphasized
that double taxation existed because California's attribution
method was different in its basic assumptions from the method
used by all the countries where taxpayer's subsidiaries operated.
The dissent asserted that California's formula had no necessary relationship to the amount of income earned in a given jurisdiction
as calculated under the arm's-length method."1 4 In fact, argued
Justice Powell, formula apportionment attributes a higher proportion of income to jurisdictions with higher wage rates, property
values, and sales. 1 5 "To the extent that California is such a jurisdiction," the dissent insists, "the formula inherently leads to
double taxation."316
The two differing views of the Court and of Justice Powell in
dissent seem to point out a significant development and change in
the area of multiple taxation. In a forthright manner the Court and
dissent both recognized that not all duplicative taxation is constitutionally proscribed. The question now simply is how much will
be judicially tolerated-a matter of degree. What type of judicial
Richter scale will be used by the Court to determine the constitutionally acceptable amount of multiple taxation? Moreover, just
how high on the judicial Richter scale must the seismic international taxation disruption reading register before the questioned
312.

Id. at 2953.

313. Id. at 2957-58. (Powell, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 2958 (Powell, J., dissenting).
315. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
316. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). As discussed above, the Court disagreed with this
facet of Justice Powell's dissent, noting that double taxation in Container,"although real,
was not the 'inevitabl[e]' result" of California's worldwide apportionment system of taxing
income. Id. at 2952. "Whether the combination of the two methods [arm's-length and

formula apportionment] results in the same income being taxed twice or in some portion of
income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on the facts of the individual case." Id.
(footnote omitted). See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.

268

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:217

tax crumbles under the weight of the constitutional multiple burdens attack?
The dissenters not only thought that the Container tax was
forbidden by the double taxation prong of the JapanLine test, but
also believed that the tax was an unconstitutional impingement of
the second aspect of Japan Line because the tax seriously implicated foreign policy issues that should be left to the federal government. Thus, Justice Powell would not have permitted California to apply its apportionment formula to Container's operation
because California's method was contrary to the federal government's preference for the arm's-length method, used not only by
the federal government but also by the foreign countries where
Container's subsidiaries operated.3 17 As Justice Powell saw it, "California has rejected accepted international practice in favor of a
tax structure that is fundamentally different in its basic assumptions."3 18 The dissent reasoned that California could conform to international practice simply by basing its apportionment calculations on the income that Container reported on its federal tax
return, using the arm's-length method.1 9 Justice Powell recognized, as did the Court, 320 that even if California adopted the
arm's-length method of attributing income, differences in applying
that method-for example, the use of different accounting principles-still could lead to double taxation.3 21 In Justice Powell's
opinion, however, these types of differences in application, although presently tolerated in practice, are not inherent in the
arm's-length system. While such disagreements in applying the
arm's-length method may be unavoidable, they nevertheless can be
resolved through international negotiations in Justice Powell's
opinion.322
317. The arm's-length method that the federal government uses has not escaped substantial criticism. For a comparison of the unitary method and the arm's-length method,
and specifically for a look at the inadequacies of the arm's-length method, see Note, MultinationalCorporationsand Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1202 (1976).
318. 103 S. Ct. at 2959 (Powell, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 2957 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 2953.
321. Id. at 2958 (Powell, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 2958-59 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Containermajority saw the matter in a somewhat different light: "[W]e have seen no
evidence demonstrating that the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in the threefactor formula is greater than the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in the sort of
separate accounting urged upon us by [taxpayer]." Id. at 2949-50. Too, as discussed above,
the ContainerCourt adhered to the traditional view that unitary formula apportionment is

19841

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

The dissent also attacked the majority's suggestion that California could impose the same tax burden on taxpayer under the
arm's-length system simply by increasing the general tax rate.32 3
To the majority the amount of tax Container paid was much more
the function of the California tax rate than the method of attributing income.
The dissent's response pointed out the troublesome
political and constitutional ramifications of the majority's suggestion. The State could hardly raise the tax rate applicable to
Container alone, or even to all corporations engaged in foreign
commerce, without encountering constitutional attacks under the
commerce and equal protection clauses, in the opinion of the dissenters. 2 5 If California raised the tax rate applicable to Container,
the State would have to raise the tax rate for all corporations similarly situated-a course of action that political restraints make
infeasible. 26
A judicial mandate that states adopt the arm's-length method
of attributing income for tax purposes would require the Court to
take judicial action it has not been willing to take: dictating to the
states how they must draft their tax statutes. 2 7 The Court, however, clearly has indicated that Congress possesses power to require
uniformity among the states in their taxation of interstate commerce. The Court has declared that
the legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation requiring all
States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of income. It is to that
body, and32 8not this Court, that the Constitution has committed such policy
decisions.

Container suggests that the Court, as well as the dissent, is
trying to balance the competing revenue demands of the states, in
getting their fair share of taxes from income earned by multinational corporations, against the corporate taxpayer's interest in
avoiding multiple taxation, as well as the demands of the Federal
necessary because separate accounting may fail to account for contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.
Id. at 2948-49. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
323. 103 S. Ct. at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 2956.
325. Id. at 2960 & n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting).
327. In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), the Court refused, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to require Iowa to compute its corporate net income under
the three-factor formula in order to prevent an overlap in the computation of taxable income. Moorman held that the Constitution does not require such a result. Id. at 277-78.
328. Id. at 280.
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Government that economic growth and harmonious international
relations not be strangled with unreasonable, hampering state
taxes that would create retaliation and trade wars among nations.
The majority and the dissent, however, seem to be poles apart on
whether the Court satisfactorily achieved this worthy objective in
329
Container.
E.

Container's Reserved Issues

The Containerdecision expressly reserved for future consideration the related issues of the states' power to tax foreign parents
of domestic subsidiaries and the states' power to tax domestic parents owned by foreign interests. The Court already has been
presented with two cases in which it could have addressed these
issues, but the Court refused to hear either case. 30 In many ways,
the Container decision was significantly less controversial than a
decision on the reserved issues necessarily would be. Some of the
problems raised in Containerare exacerbated when the legal incidence of the tax falls not on a domestic corporation but on a foreign entity. In particular, problems relating to (1) the taxation of
foreign source income; (2) possible frustration of United States foreign commerce; (3) increased risks of international double taxation;
and (4) overallocation of income to the states due to noncompatibility of domestic and foreign apportionment factors would be
significantly more difficult
to handle in the two reserved situations
3 31
than in Container itself. 2

One particularly sensitive issue raised in the reserved situations concerns the states' demands for information about the foreign corporation's operations. Vast amounts of information, of
course, are required to ensure that the foreign corporation's income is correctly stated and that its apportionment factors (such
329. For comments on Container, see Delap, supra note 42, at 210; The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 70, 112-17 (1983); Note, State Taxation of Foreign
Source Income Through Worldwide Combined Reporting, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95
(1984). For critical comment, see Elliott & Cohen, Court Gives States Right To Tax Multinational Earnings, LEGAL TIMES, July 25, 1983, reprinted in M. CAPLIN & R. ELLIOTr,
STATE

TAXATION OF MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS

STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAX

AFTER CONTAINER

CORP.: CORPORATE

3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as AFTER

CONTAINER CORP.].

330. See Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir), cert. denied sub
nom. Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Franchetti, 104 S. Ct. 537 (1983); Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 558 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (facts contained in 539 F. Supp. 512
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)), aff'd without opinion, No. 83-7236 (2d Cir. June 17, 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 705 (1984).
331. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
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as property, payroll, and sales) are appropriately valued. In certain
situations, these information requests may run afoul of foreign corporate secrecy laws, 3 2 and in all situations the requests will impose
heavy administrative burdens on the foreign corporations.
Generally, in cases concerning domestic taxation of foreign
corporations or of domestic corporations of foreign control, information necessary to satisfy state auditors likely will be in the control of foreign subsidiaries. These subsidiaries will not be particularly amenable to expending the time and resources necessary to
provide their American counterparts with the required information.333 Meanwhile, the states, in light of the Court's newly enunciated doctrine that it will defer to the decision of the state court on
the unitary issue,3 3 4 the Court's presumption in favor of the validity of an assessed tax, and the long-established doctrine that the
onus is on the corporation to produce sufficient information to
prove that the state's assessment is not fair, will be in a stronger
position than ever."'
Container's reserved situations certainly call for careful balancing of all the interests concerned. Perhaps the Court is taking
the only reasonable course available-a hands-off approach as far
as feasible. Most assuredly in the reserved situations and perhaps
in general, the issue of state taxation of foreign source income
through application of formula apportionment demands congressional attention. The problem may become so thorny and of such
magnitude that Congress may find it necessary to respond to the
demand.3 8

332. See ArER CONTAINER CORP., supra note 329, at 3.
333. See id.
334.

See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.

335. See Brief of Petitioner at 24, Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Franchetti, 104 S. Ct. 537
(1983), denying cert. to Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The
imposition of huge penalties on Shell Oil is a patent device to coerce [the foreign parent]
into obtaining the demanded data at tremendous expense and providing it to the Board.
Indeed, Shell Oil is being held hostage to coerce [the parent] to submit to the Board's
demands.").
336. For a description of legislative proposals by Congress relating to limitations on
state taxation of interstate business and foreign source corporate income, see Description of
S. 983 and S. 1688 Relating to State Taxation of Interstate and Foreign Source Income,
Prepared for Use of the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the
Committee on Finance (June 24, 1980), reprinted in AFTER CONTAINER CORP., supra note
329, at 80.

